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The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States fundamentally altered the degree and 
scope of transnational security cooperation and collaboration, more specifically, 
counter-terrorism cooperation. Within 24 hours of this historic occurrence, the United 
Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368, which resulted in 
far-reaching consequences for its 194 member states. The adoption of Resolution 
1373 followed three weeks later, and this compelled all member states to domesticate 
specific counter-terrorism legislation that criminalised terrorist activities and the 
financing thereof. This thesis argues that from a regime-theory perspective, the United 
States acts as the global enforcer of the international counter-terrorism regime by 
inducing cooperation and collaboration with other weaker states in the international 
system to ensure compliance. The study adopted four political factors that explain the 
varying degrees of compliance with the counter-terrorism regime demonstrated by 
Kenya and Tanzania. The study argues that Kenya is a more willing partner in the 
global fight against terrorism because of its perceived perception of the threat it faces. 
Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has been a reluctant participant and has suffered the 
hegemonic wrath of the United States when its nationals were barred from travelling 
to the United States on 31 January 2020 due to the country not sharing 
terrorism-related information with the United States. Although Tanzania passed its 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 with minimum obstruction, this has not been 
sufficient for the country to be portrayed as a supportive state on the ‘Global War on 
Terrorism’ since it is yet to designate the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab as terrorist 
organisations. Furthermore, the study provided a comprehensive overview of the 
terrorism landscapes of Kenya and Tanzania and concluded that the former faces a 
significant threat from terrorism because of its geographical proximity to the threat, its 
porous borders and its decision to be an active participant in the African Union Mission 





Die 9/11 terroriste aanvalle op die Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) het die wese 
en draagwydte van internasionale samewerking op sekuriteitsgebied in die algemeen, 
en teen-terroristiese optrede in die besonder, grondig verander. In die bestek van 24 
uur na dié historiese gebeurtenis, het die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies, 
eenparig Resolusie 1358 aangeneem, met wydreikende gevolge vir die 194 lidstate.  
Voorts het Resolusie 1373, wat ‘n skamele drie weke daarna aangeneem is dit 
verpligtend gemaak vir alle lidstate om spesifieke teen-terrorisme wetgewing in hulle 
eie domein te promulgeer wat terrorisitiese aktiwiteite, sowel as die finansiering 
daarvan, gekriminaliseer het. Hierdie tesis postuleer, dat gesien vanuit ‘n regime 
teoretiese perspektief, die Verneigdie State van Amerika (VSA), optree as a globale 
afdwinger van ‘n teen-terrorisme regime deur gedwonge samewerking met ander 
swakker en kleiner state in die internasionale sisteem, om nakoming te verseker. Die 
studie maak gebruik van vier politieke veranderlikes word om die wisselende mate van 
nakoming van die teen-terrorisme regime deur Kenia en Tanzanië te ontleed. Die 
studie voer aan dat Kenia ‘n meer inskiklike vennoot is as gevolg van dié land se 
bedreigingspersepsie. In teenstelling met Kenia is Tanzanië ‘n minder gewillige 
vennoot van die Verenigde State van Amerika. Dié land se burgers is gevolglik op 31 
Januarie 2020 deur die VSA geweier om die land binne te kom op grond daarvan dat 
Tanzanië onwillig is om terrorisme-verwante inligting met die VSA uit te ruil. 
Nieteenstaande Tanzanië se aanname van dié land se Prevention of Terrorism Act 
van 2002 (Wet op die Voorkoming van Terrorisme), was dit nie voldoende om 
Tanzanië as voldoende ondersteunend van die VSA se ‘Global War on Terror’ 
(Globale Oorlog teen Terrorisme) te beskou nie, veral omdat dié land nog nie die 
Islamitiese Staat (ISIS) en Al-Shabaab as terroriste organisasies verklaar het nie.     
Verder bied die studie ‘n omvangryke en diepgaande oorsig van die terrorisme 
landskappe in Kenia en Tanzanië. Teen die agtergrond van die oorsig, kom die studie 
tot die gevolgtrekking dat Kenia ‘n veel meer beduidende terroristiese bedreiging as 
Tanzanië ervaar as gevolg van verskeie faktore, waaronder: dié land se deelname 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction and background to the study 
Over the last four decades, the geography and nature of terrorism has undergone 
significant alterations as the actors involved, the methods and the response continue 
to evolve. On one end of the spectrum, authors such as Steven Pinker (2012), in his 
seminal book, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined, contends 
that the world is a much safer place today than it was in the 20th century due to 
diminished open warfare. At the other end of the scale, the events of 9/11 created a 
heightened sense of vulnerability and insecurity, and nations around the globe have 
introduced a plethora of security strategies to offset the dangers posed by terrorism. 
The ‘Global War on Terrorism’ championed by the United States has not spared 
countries in the developing world when promulgating, formulating and implementing 
laws and policies to deal with the threat of terrorism. Of late, the states of Kenya and 
Tanzania continue to face the threat of terrorism as a consequence of domestic and 
foreign policy decisions. Since 9/11, the threat of terrorist violence and terrorist attacks 
have galvanised nations around the world to mobilise and collectively combat the 
scourge of terrorism. 
In addition, the United States and Western nations have since pursued an aggressive 
campaign to invent and impose counter-terrorist legal instruments and governance 
systems on less developed nations that are to be implemented in the respective 
countries even though the threat of terrorism is minimal in some of these nations. The 
‘Global War on Terrorism’ launched by the Bush Administration in 2001 has witnessed 
a proliferation of counter-terrorism measures employed by the United Nations (UN) 
and international organisations. These initiatives seek to cut off sources of finance for 
terrorist groups and impede their ability to manipulate and use the international 
financial system to launder money, raise funds and spread their terrorist ideology. 
Before the 9/11 attacks, both Kenya and Tanzania were at the receiving end of the 
fanatical ideologues of international terrorism when the international terrorist group, 
Al-Qaeda, bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. Muhula 
(2007:43) asserts that although the two countries had a friendly relationship with the 




a political nature (exclusion of the Muslim population in economic and political 
activities). Mills (2004:17) observes that the terrorist attack “cost the lives of 224 
people (including 12 Americans) and injured 4,574 more”. Consequently, the United 
States has been assisting Kenya and Tanzania in combating violent extremism and 
implementing other measures pertaining to anti-money laundering and terrorism 
financing. Similarly, Whitaker (2010:639) argues that:  
Through a range of international agreements, governments were pressed to join 
the ‘War on Terror’ by adopting domestic legislation, sharing intelligence, and 
cracking down on target groups. Despite heavy pressure, most obviously from 
the US, levels of compliance with the regime have varied. Some countries have 
jumped on board and seized the anti-terrorism rhetoric, others have been 
reluctant partners, and several have resisted the imposition of the regime.  
Existing literature on regime theory is more extensive in the areas of environmental 
and economic cooperation and governance. 
From an international security perspective, current international agreements are 
dominated by regimes, “which prohibit, both in international law and in the domestic 
criminal law of states, the involvement of state and non-state actors in particular 
activities” (Nadelmann, 1990:479). This is often seen to be the case in specific issue 
areas such as the non-proliferation and bilateral regimes concerning nuclear and 
conventional weapons, especially amongst strong states. Similarly, Anagnostakis 
(2012:1) argues that from a regime-theory perspective, “an overarching, 
all-encompassing counter-terrorism regime does not exist and a piece-meal approach 
is followed where patterns of cooperation emerge only in specific sectors”. However, 
the events of 9/11 catapulted the emergence of regional and international 
counter-terrorism cooperation, which led to the creation of the UN Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC) that is tasked with ensuring that all member states promulgate laws 
and policies that “criminalize, prevent, and punish terrorism-related activities” 
(Whitaker, 2010:641). Ultimately, the objective is to develop an international legal 
framework against terrorism (Whitaker, 2010:641). Turning to Africa, through the 
transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (established in 1963) into 
the African Union (AU) (1999), the continent embarked on an agenda of creating new 




institutions and norms was the establishment of the Africa Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) to deal with conflict prevention and conflict reconstruction on the 
continent (Engel & Porto, 2014:190). The key structures and operational mandates of 
the APSA are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
1.2 Problem statement and focus 
Recent attacks in Kenya such as the Dusit Hotel attack on 15 January 2019 by the 
Al-Shabaab terrorist group that killed 26 people and the low-level sporadic attacks in 
Tanzania linked with terrorists underscore the existing and future threat of terrorism. 
The ability of these states to have complete monopoly on violence has been severely 
challenged by non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab who seek to instil fear and terror 
amongst the general populace. Their security apparatus is on constant and heightened 
alert to detect, disrupt and dismantle terror groups that continue to inflict destruction 
and mass casualties with their reign of terror. The security threat posed by Al-Shabaab 
in the region undermines the rule of law, compromises public safety and staves off 
potential investors and tourists who contribute immensely towards the national 
development agenda of these states. Despite Kenya and Tanzania complying with 
their international commitments (enacting counter-terrorism legislation) towards 
combating terrorism, both countries have been found wanting in other aspects 
(Whitaker, 2010:640) such as information sharing pertaining to terrorism and the 
designation of international terrorist networks such as the Islamic State. 
The international counter-terrorism regime comprises a host of statutes, conventions 
and other agreements that have been formed by the United Nations Security Council 
(UN Security Council) through the adoption of Resolution 1373 that criminalises 
terrorism and the financing thereof. However, as the subsequent chapters 
demonstrate, the UN acts as a ‘global legislator’ and its role is limited to capacitating 
member states in the formulation of specific counter-terrorism laws. In contrast, the 
United States acts as a ‘global enforcer’ by engaging in bilateral relations on the 
hard-core aspects (intelligence sharing, establishment of ant-terrorism police units, 
training in prosecuting terrorist suspects, etc.). This study argues that the United 
States, as the victim of the most significant terror attack in the 21st century and the 




international counter-terrorism regime. However, the country has imposed such a 
regime on less powerful states such as Kenya and Tanzania that are outside the UN 
counter-terrorism framework. Based on the above problem statement, this study 
provides an analysis of the international counter-terrorism regime by employing 
‘regime theory’ as the theoretical anchor to explain the formation and maintenance of 
the counter-terrorism regime and the various political factors that influence the 
compliance of the case studies under discussion. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
The main research question that the study aimed to address is as follows:  
How do political factors explain the degree of variance in compliance with the 
international counter-terrorism regime by Kenya and Tanzania?  
The following sub-questions provided guidance in answering the main research 
question: 
1. What is the nature and extent of terrorism threats in Kenya and Tanzania? 
2. How does regime theory explain the emergence of the international 
counter-terrorism regime, particularly with respect to Kenya and Tanzania? 
In order to answer the first research sub-question, chapters 1 and 2 provide a broad 
overview of the nature and extent of the threat confronting Kenya and Tanzania. In 
addition, Chapter 2 covers the wider key themes of terrorism/counter-terrorism 
scholarship (why terrorism happens at the levels that it does, what it achieves, and the 
non-state actors involved). Chapter 4 presents additional detail by highlighting specific 
terrorist incidents experienced by Kenya and Tanzania. Furthermore, Chapter 4 aims 
to provide the answers to the main research question and the secondary research 
questions of the study by dissecting and analysing the various counter-terrorism 
measures adopted by Kenya and Tanzania and applying the theoretical framework to 





1.4 Goal of the study 
The goal of this study is to generate knowledge and a better understanding of the level 
of compliance demonstrated by Kenya and Tanzania in adopting and implementing 
international counter-terrorism measures in their respective jurisdictions. An overview 
of the general threat of terrorism in these states is provided as a background and their 
degree of compliance is analysed by examining specific political factors. Furthermore, 
the study assesses the influence of regime theory in the establishment of the 
international counter-terrorism regime by delving into the two dominant theories 
(realism and liberalism) of international relations (IR).  
 
1.5 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical point of departure for this study is derived from Beth Whitaker’s 
(2010:639) journal article titled, ‘Compliance among Weak States: Africa and the 
Counter-Terrorism Regime’ in which she contends that conformity with the 
international counter-terrorism regime has been met with reluctance by some states 
in Africa. This research study uses Whitaker’s (2010) argument that for various 
reasons, a significant number of countries in the developing world have joined the 
anti-terrorism rhetoric while others have stalled and are not cooperating with a range 
of international legal instruments and agreements. The above scholarly work and 
regime theory are useful tools of analysis because they attempt to explain the process 
behind the establishment of international institutions and the various interests that 
shape and influence their operations. 
In addition, the current study invoked a number of scholarly works on regimes and the 
rationale behind their establishment in the international system. Considering all the 
above, the regime-theory perspective was the primary theoretical frame of analysis for 
this study. The study consulted the relevant literature on regime theory by engaging 
the two dominant IR theories on regimes, namely liberal institutionalism and realism. 
Despite the diverging ideological inclinations, “both acknowledge that although the 
international system is anarchic (without a ruler) in structure, it has never been anomic 
(without rules)” (Little, 2014:218). However, the current study highlights the main 




regarding the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism measures and cooperation in the 
international system. As Robert Cox (1981:28) remarkably maintains, “Theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose.”  
 
1.6 Research design and methods 
This study is mainly explanatory but at the same time is a descriptive type of a 
comparative case study. The study focuses on the compliance levels with the 
international counter-terrorism regime of two specific countries, namely Kenya and 
Tanzania, the extent of terrorism in these countries and their respective state 
institutions tasked with dealing with counter-terrorism. The comparative case study 
approach was useful in unravelling the similarities and differences (Bukhari, 2011:2) 
with reference to the specific political factors used to measure compliance with the 
international counter-terrorism regime. The descriptive part of the research narrated 
in detail the terrorism landscapes of the two cases and the various laws, institutions 
and practices of their governmental agencies tasked with dealing with terrorism. The 
explanatory elements of the study unpacked the facts that are already known and 
described and prompted the question regarding why things are the way they are (De 
Vos, Delport, Fouché & Strydom, 2011:96). 
This study adopted content analysis because it enables the researcher “to organize 
and elicit meaning from the data collected and to draw realistic conclusions from it’” 
(Bengsston, 2016:1). This is possible since data are arranged into themes, categories 
and sub-headings to ensure that information that directly answers the main research 
question, aims and objectives is presented in a coherent manner. Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this study present a systematic organisation of the central issues under examination. 
More specifically, the political factors determining compliance with the international 
counter-terrorism regime are discussed in Chapter 3 and thereafter analysed in 
Chapter 4.  
In order to make sense of the collected data, constant analyses of the data occurred 
in line with “regularity and variability of the preliminary findings throughout the study” 
(De Vos et al., 2011:403). This study relied entirely on secondary data sources such 




literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism in general is voluminous and new 
information is constantly being released, which had a significant impact on the overall 
findings. The process of constant review and analysis was crucial towards realising 
the goals of the study. The research instrument that the researcher employed during 
the study was desk research, that is, a literature survey. The most recent and relevant 
books, journals and newspaper articles were surveyed, which provided critical insight 
into the topic that the researcher undertook.  
 
1.7 Ethical considerations 
De Vos et al. (2011:114) define ethics as follows: 
[A] set of moral principles which is suggested by an individual or group, is 
subsequently widely accepted, and which offers rules and behavioural 
expectations about the most correct conduct towards experimental subjects and 
respondents, employers, sponsors, other researchers, assistants and students.  
As stated in the previous section, this study did not engage with primary sources 
(interviews) as a form of data collection; hence, no one was harmed or negatively 
affected in any way during the study. Furthermore, all sources of information are duly 
acknowledged and referenced where appropriate.  
 
1.8 Limitations of the study 
This study would have benefitted tremendously from structured in-depth interviews 
with people who are employed in the national security apparatus of Kenya and 
Tanzania in order to gauge their views on the pertinent issues pertaining to security 
policies, programmes and other counter-terrorism measures that are not classified. 
Primary research on terrorism poses a potentially dangerous endeavour since terrorist 
groups are known to decapitate or execute their victims (including journalists) to 
perpetuate their reign of terror and punish the ‘infidels’ or non-believers. However, for 
the current study, the existing literature on counter-terrorism cooperation for the two 
case studies together with the significant theoretical scholarship on regime theory is 





1.9 Outline of the study 
This study consists of five chapters. 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
This chapter introduces the reader to the subject under investigation by providing a 
substantive but brief overview of the historical context of the research topic and its 
significance. Furthermore, Chapter 1 clearly outlines the research objectives and the 
research questions of the study in sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
Chapter 2: Understanding terrorism: A conceptual review  
This chapter provides a comprehensive conceptual overview of terrorism as a highly 
complex phenomenon and presents the actors and the major causes of terrorism. A 
critique of the existing literature is offered. The chapter provides the overall foundation 
by identifying key published literature relevant to this study. 
Chapter 3: The international counter-terrorism regime: A regime-theory 
perspective  
This chapter focuses on the international counter-terrorism regime from a ‘regime 
theory’ perspective and highlights the origin and rationale behind the establishment of 
regimes. Furthermore, the chapter serves as the theoretical anchor and provides an 
overview of regimes as conceptualised by the IR strands of liberal institutionalism and 
realism. 
Chapter 4: The counter-terrorism regime in Africa: A case study of Kenya and 
Tanzania 
This chapter presents the various counter-terrorism tools and instruments 
promulgated by Kenya and Tanzania to comply with the global counter-terrorism 
regime. Furthermore, Chapter 4 discusses the patterns and depth of cooperation with 
regional and international institutions in the fight against terrorism. With reference to 
the theoretical framework adopted in Chapter 3, this chapter provides a comparative 




the two case studies and critically discusses the findings of the specific areas in which 
there is convergence and divergence with the counter-terrorism regime. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations  
The final chapter draws conclusions and determines whether the research questions 
of this study have been answered. In addition, recommendations for possible future 




CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW 
“We love death. The U.S. loves life. That is the difference between us two.” 
Osama bin Laden 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to achieve the secondary objective of this study, which is to offer an overview 
of the nature and extent of the terrorism threats that confront Kenya and Tanzania, 
this chapter delves into the causes of terrorism and specifically highlights the threats 
faced by the countries under investigation. In addition, this chapter provides the overall 
conceptual framework that encompasses the research questions and the problem 
statement of the current study. The genesis of security regimes and counter-terrorism 
cannot be understood without an in-depth discussion and analysis of terrorism. This 
chapter attempts to unpack the theoretical fundamentals of terrorism by investigating 
its various motivations and purposes and provides the overall foundation by identifying 
the key published literature that is relevant to the study. In doing so, the study is able 
to identify existing gaps in the field of terrorism and discuss the shortcomings and 
strengths in the literature. Chapter 2 commences by providing an overview towards 
understanding terrorism and defines the concept of terrorism according to various 
scholars. Furthermore, the chapter discusses and interprets the moral constructions 
of the concept and the various actors involved. In addition, it will seek to explain the 
causes and psychology of terrorism on a global level. A historical chronology of 
terrorism has been explored in various scholarly work and does not need to be 
reiterated in depth. 
This chapter provides an in-depth overview of terrorism as an academic field of inquiry 
and narrates how terrorism is a highly complex phenomenon that has been vigorously 
debated for several decades without a definitive definition. A recent survey of the 
academic material on this topic by the Global Terrorism Index (2018:2) found that 
although the vigour of terrorism has been significantly reduced, 103 countries around 
the world suffered at least one terrorist incident in 2018, and 71 countries recorded 
one casualty over the same period. As the following chapter illustrates, both Kenya 
and Tanzania have experienced the scourge of terrorism in one way or another, with 




short description on the terrorism landscape on the African continent, including the 
states of Kenya and Tanzania. Furthermore, the subsequent chapters provides a 
detailed description and analysis of the factors that explain the varying degree in 
compliance with the counter-terrorism regime.  
 
2.2 Key concepts 
2.2.1 Terrorism 
For a concept and phenomenon that has gained increasing prominence as an 
academic field of study since the 1970s, scholars around the world still cannot agree 
on a definition for terrorism. This definitional paralysis has led to a plethora of 
conceptualisations that present different ideas about the same concept. Even though 
several researchers and practitioners contest the conceptualisation of terrorism, the 
indiscriminate use of violence on civilians is paramount. Baylis, Wirtz and Gray 
(2010:269) argue that terrorism is underpinned by the following elements: “it is 
intended to influence an audience beyond its immediate victims; and it violates the 
standards of discretion and proportionality for the use of force under the customary 
Law of Armed Conflict”. However, there is no ambiguity regarding the contextualisation 
of the concept in terms of framing it within the broader research question and problem 
statement presented in Chapter 1. This is as a result of the consensus arrived at by 
various scholars which is dissected further in subsequent sections of this chapter.  
 
2.2.2 Terrorist 
Aligned with the definition of terrorism above, a terrorist today refers to a 
non-state/state actor who commits an act of terrorism such as bombing, assassination, 
hijacking and shooting with a clear political or ideological inclination to influence 
government policy or to achieve a particular goal. The common adage of ‘one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ resonates more with former liberation 
movements / revolutionary terrorists/terrorism, with some currently being in 
government (e.g. the African National Congress [ANC] in South Africa and the South 




Schmid (2011:692) observes that individuals carrying out acts of terrorism are 
reluctant to be referred to as terrorists and prefer to be labelled with more liberating 
titles such as “freedom fighter”, “resistance fighter”, “urban guerrilla” and 
“mudjahedeen”. A detailed description of how terrorists identify themselves is 
presented further in this chapter. 
 
2.2.3 Counter-terrorism 
The term of counter-terrorism is perhaps the most important term in this study because 
it highlights and unpacks the various pertinent issues relating to the international 
counter-terrorism regime that address the research questions for the two case studies 
under interrogation. The United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
(2006) is used as a guide for the international community to have a common and 
strategic operational approach in the fight against terrorism and states that nations 
should send an unequivocal message that terrorism is unacceptable and inhumane 
(United Nations, 2006). Baylis et al. (2010:269) define counter-terrorism as “practices, 
strategies, and policies that governments employ to fight terrorism”. Stated differently, 
counter-terrorism comprises all the resources (physical, human and financial) that are 
required to thwart the lethal threat these groups pose to humankind. Since this is 
central to this study, a detailed discussion is undertaken in Chapter 3.  
 
2.2.4 Regime 
Ward (2016:1) conceptualises a regime as “an institution with clear substantive and 
geographical limits, bound by explicit rules, and agreed on by governments”. Another 
definition of regime is given by Schmid (2004:681) who defines a regime as a “form of 
rule” that can be a “democratic regime”,” totalitarian regime” or a “communist regime”. 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the definition outlined by Ward (2016:1) was 
employed to refer to the various legal instruments and agreements enforced by the 
two nations, and the ‘regime theory’ was applied as a frame of analysis to answer the 





2.2.5 Al-Shabaab (Harakaat al-shabaab al-Mujaahidiin) 
The Islamic insurgent group based in Somalia is deemed by the State Department of 
the U.S. as a terrorist organisation since February 2008, and has pledged allegiance 
to Al-Qaeda, the international terrorist network, in 2012 (Felter, Masters & Sergie, 
2020). This organisation is responsible for a significant number of terrorist attacks 
carried in East Africa and continues to target the nations of Kenya, Uganda and has 
on numerous occasions attempted to attack Ethiopia for their involvement in a regional 
military operation to remove the group from controlling swathes of territory in Somalia. 
The terrorist group remains committed towards removing the Somali government and 
imposing a strict version of Sharia law.  
 
2.3 Understanding terrorism 
It is extremely difficult to study and understand contemporary global security issues 
without a discussion of terrorism and the impact it has on human security and 
development around the globe. The terrorism threat faced by Kenya and Tanzania has 
negatively affected their tourism sectors and has diverted much-needed resources to 
combating terrorism. For these reasons, it is crucial to provide a background to the 
issues and trends regarding the conceptual issues around terrorism and how its 
background relates to the research questions and problem statement outlined in 
Chapter 1. This increasing global phenomenon has led to a proliferation of scholarly 
inquiry, with academic think tanks on security and political violence and states around 
the globe formulating and implementing laws and policies to combat the threat and 
spread of terrorism. However, the response and attitude towards terrorism has varied 
significantly from country to country since the end of the Cold War. The actors, causes, 
methods and geography of terrorism have evolved tremendously over time. As a 
result, there remains an ideological divide between states that fought for self-
determination and those that pursued an imperial agenda. Former ‘terrorists’ were now 
government leaders tasked with representing their states on international platforms 
such as the United Nations to debate issues of terrorism and state sponsors of 
terrorism. Put differently, any discussion or debate on defining and understanding 
terrorism should be analysed from the lexicon of the beholder. Similarly, Ramsbotham, 




governments may all adopt terrorist tactics at various times in order to further their 
political or economic purposes and then abandon them while still pursuing those 
purposes”. 
It is important to note, however, that there is much disagreement about what 
constitutes terrorism in terms of the threat and actual perpetration of violence towards 
non-combatants, government personnel or installations and the objective to instil fear 
beyond the targeted victims in order to communicate a certain message with the aim 
of undermining the authority and legitimacy of a given state. Laqueur and Wall 
(2018:28-29), as authorities on terrorism, affirm that understanding terrorism remains 
a complex endeavour because of its nature. Firstly, the character and purpose of 
terrorism itself has changed drastically. This refers to the actors, the means they 
employ and the ends they strive to achieve. Secondly, the authors contend that 
another significant challenge to understanding terrorism is structural and assert that 
terrorism is not an ideology but an instrument of the insurrectionist and the politician 
alike that is used by both individuals or groups and the state (Laqueur & Wall, 
2018:28). Finally, since “terrorism and the decision to employ it can be conducted by 
anyone, its attraction supersedes the capacity of foreign states to regulate thought, 
and thus transverses the borders of physical and political doctrines” (Laqueur & Wall, 
2018:29). 
 
2.4 Radicalisation: A prelude to terrorism?  
Although there has been a proliferation of attempts and initiatives to prevent the 
spread of terrorism and ‘radicalisation’, renowned terrorism scholar, Schmid 
(2013:10), contends that the concept ‘radicalisation’ is problematic because it is a new 
phenomenon that means different things to different people. Similarly, Horgan (2011) 
observes that there is a tendency to confuse terrorism with radicalisation even though 
the two concepts are different: “not every radical becomes a terrorist, and not every 
terrorist holds radical views”. As a research topic that only emerged in 2004/2005 to 
understand the sources of terrorism (Schmid, 2013:2), the concept of radicalisation, 
like terrorism, remains a matter of debate amongst scholars and has been 
predominantly studied within the Muslim community, especially in the Middle East after 




regarding the concept, the International Journal of Conflict and Violence (2011) 
provided a plethora of definitions of the concept in their introduction titled, ‘Processes 
of Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation’ (Schmid 2013:6). One of the several attempts 
to define ‘radicalisation’ is as follows: 
Many researchers conceptualize radicalization as a process characterized by 
increased commitment to and use of violent means and strategies in political 
conflicts. Radicalization from this point of view entails a change in perceptions 
towards polarizing and absolute definitions of a given situation, and the 
articulation of increasingly ‘radical’ aims and objectives. It may evolve from 
enmity towards certain social groups, or societal institutions and structure. It may 
also entail the increasing use of violent means. (Schmid, 2013:6) 
The above categorisation of the term has taken on a new dimension, with U.S. 
President Donald Trump labelling terrorism committed by Muslims as ‘Radical Islamic 
Terrorism’ and promising to “eradicate radical Islamic terrorism from the face of the 
earth” (Ramakrishna, 2017:2). As the following section illustrates, ‘radicalisation’ is 
only one of the causes of terrorism.  
As with all social phenomenon, a historical context is crucial in order to understand 
how terrorism has evolved over time and the political dynamics that shaped it.  
 
2.5 Historical perspectives on terrorism 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been evolving over the last decades from 
the most profound democracies to autocratic regimes and from organised terrorist 
groups to ‘lone wolf’ actors who conduct terror activities without any direct link to or 
support from established and organised terrorist organisations. Hoffman (2017:3) 
opines that the concept ‘terrorism’ was originally popularised during the French 
Revolution when it had a positive connotation. British philosopher, Edmund Burke, 
introduced the term ‘terrorism’ in its contemporary context. The régime de la Terreur, 
commonly known in English as the Reign of Terror of June 1793 to July 1794, was 
used to establish law and order during the transient anarchical period of chaos and 
the political uprisings of 1789 and to address other challenges to state authority. 




that brutally suppressed and intimidated its citizens using its monopoly of violence and 
labelled ‘counterrevolutionaries’ as  ‘enemies of the people’. (Hoffman, 2017). To be 
able to understand the systematic use of terror during this period, Martin (2019:25) 
explains: 
The ferocity of the Reign of Terror is reflected in the number of victims. Between 
17,000 and 40,000 persons were executed, and perhaps 200,000 political 
prisoners died in prisons from disease and starvation. Two incidents illustrate the 
communal nature of this violence. In Lyon, 700 people were massacred by 
cannon fire in the town square. In Nantes, thousands were drowned in the Loire 
River when the boats they were detained in were sunk. 
Garrison (2003:44) affirms that the state used terrorism as a tool to achieve 
government objectives and systematically to suppress opposition to the state. At the 
level of non-state actors, Russia had its fair share of terror activities perpetrated by a 
group called Narodnaya Volya (The People’s Will / The People’s Freedom) that 
emerged in 1879. The movement’s grievance was a direct result of students’ 
discontent with the czarist regime in the late 19th century. A significant number of the 
students who had studied abroad were influenced by Marxism and Anarchism and 
embraced these ideologies, which they used to challenge the state to embark on 
reforms that promoted human rights, particularly for the peasants (Martin, 2019:26). 
In fact, the first person who was recognised as a terrorist during this period was Vera 
Zasulich, a 26-year-old social revolutionary “who shot the Governor of St Petersburg 
in 1878 to protest the Russian state’s repression of domestic political protest” 
(Fridlund, 2019:1). 
Fridlund (2019:1) notes that the terror activities and struggle of the Narodnaya Volya 
against the Russian state was praised and welcomed by Western observers to such 
an extent that Mark Twain remarked “that if the Russian government cannot be 
overthrown otherwise than by dynamite, then thank God for dynamite!” The above 
sentiment was expressed after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 by 
Narodnaya Volya with a dynamite bomb. The operational capability of the group 
demonstrates the fervour of the group to influence a change that would accommodate 
their interests even if it caused their own death. The violence committed by terrorist 




violence, and it gives credence to Thomas Hobbes’ analogy that a government can 
only be legitimate if it offers safety and security to its people. Similarly, Laqueur and 
Wall (2018:88) argue: 
[T]errorists challenge this relationship by making the state seem weak, impotent, 
and unable to respond to the seemingly randomness of terrorist-driven chaos. 
The breakdown of this relationship is what creates mass discontent, political 
uprisings, revolutions, and, at its worst, civil wars. 
History demonstrates that contemporary terrorism has evolved as a direct 
consequence of the availability of weapons and the role of the media in bringing 
terrorism to the public’s attention, thus feeding one’s imagination. In setting up his 
main argument, Rapoport (2004:47), in his academic piece titled ‘The Four Waves of 
Modern Terrorism’ posits that “modern terrorism has progressed through four waves 
that lasted for roughly 40 years each and that we now live in a fourth wave” (Rapoport, 
2004 . He describes the phases of terrorism as:  “(1)The anarchist wave: 1880s to the 
end of World War 1; (2) The anti-colonial wave: End of World War 1 until the late 
1960s; (3) The New Left wave: Late 1960s to the near present; and (4) The religious 
wave: Approximately 1980 to the present” (Rapoport, 2004:47). 
It is pivotal to understand that contemporary terrorists (as part of the fourth wave), 
have fundamentally changed in terms of character as they attempt to inflict mass 
casualties and achieve the ultimate destruction of infidels (non-believers). 
International terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State that 
commit terror acts in the name of Islam can challenge the very concept of the 
nation-state as they seek to erase the borders of Muslim nations and establish a 
caliphate governed by Sharia law (Laqueur & Wall, 2018:2). Since the ascendance of 
the Islamic State in 2014, the group has overpowered the Iraqi and the Syrian military 
by seizing large swathes of territories and has brought certain political regions in Iraq 
and Syria under its direct control. The fanatical ideologues of the 21st century have a 
strong propensity not to negotiate as they seek to establish a new political order in the 
Middle East, committing horrific acts of violence such as crucifixions, decapitations 
and massacres and transmitting this via social media (Laqueur & Wall, 2018:93).  
Unlike the previous ‘waves of terrorism’, the religious wave targets their victims 




fanatics do not always have direct links and control over the terror groups or individuals 
that carry out violence in their name. The phenomenon of the ‘lone wolf’ terrorist 
inspired by mass communications via various media platforms continues to pose a 
security challenge to the security of states around the world. Any policy response to 
the threat posed by terrorism needs to consider and comprehend the historical context 
that inspires modern day terrorism.  
 
2.6 Deconstructing terrorism 
Despite the absence of a global consensus on the definition of terrorism, a plethora of 
legal instruments, conventions and institutions are dedicated to combat and prevent 
the spread of terrorism. The extensive literature published in the past decades by 
various scholars and independent researchers about terrorism has not addressed the 
definitional paralysis that continues unabated. For these reasons, Schmid (2004:384) 
contends that the term terrorism is a man-made construct that reflects the interests of 
those defining it. Nonetheless, other experts on terrorism such as Hoffman (2017:43-
44) opine that it is pivotal to distinguish terrorists from other forms political violence 
perpetuated other criminals.  Hoffman (2017:43-44) summarises terrorism as follows: 
“ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent or equally important, threatening 
violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the 
immediate victim or target; conducted by an organisation with an identifiable chain of 
command or a conspiratorial cell structure (members wear no uniform or identifying 
insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals who are influenced, 
motivated or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist 
movement or its leaders or both; and perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state 
entity”.  
It can be seen from the above conceptualisations that terrorism is inherently violent in 
nature and is dominantly perpetrated by non-state actors. Expanding on this idea, 
Crenshaw (2011:4) differs from Hoffman (2017) as she argues that one should not 
invoke a state versus non-state actor analogy as states employ a plethora of methods 
to carry out violence. Put differently, states equally have the capacity and motive to 
carry out terror activities in the same fashion as ‘terrorists’ by employing the same 




have the moral ground in defining terrorism? Should it be the state that is engulfed in 
a protracted conflict with a separatist movement or the ethnic community that is 
constantly attacking the state due to discrimination? Notwithstanding these limitations, 
the various definitions applied by international organisations such as the UN, regional 
bodies such as the European Union (EU) and the AU, experts, and governments and 
their respective institutions have provided the impetus to frame terrorism within a 
specific context, leading to the development of various laws and policies to deal with 
the threat and spread of contemporary terrorism. In the African context, which is the 
primary focus of this study, the AU (previously the OAU) in its convention titled, OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism defined a terrorist act as 
follows: 
a) “Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may 
endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury death 
to, any person, any number or group of persons; or cause or may cause 
damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or 
cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: 
i. intimidate, put fear into, force, coerce or induce any government, 
body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do, or 
abstain from doing, any act; or to adopt or abandon a particular 
standpoint; or to act according to certain principles; or 
ii. disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the 
public or to create a public emergency; or 
iii. create general insurrection in a State. 
b) Any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, 
encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any 
person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii)”. 
(OAU, 1999:3-4) 
The second point is problematic since citizens in Africa and around the globe protest 
for a variety of reasons such as free speech, employment conditions, service delivery 
and other human rights issues that may lead to a disruption of government services. 
Should these be construed as terrorism? Will these protesters be treated the same as 




is used, and its root causes, is where most of the disagreements about terrorism 
begin”. The point that Kiras (2011:366) makes is paramount since the various forms 
of violence that are carried out by various actors with different objectives should be 
analysed and treated differently. Like terrorists, bank robbers, car thieves and other 
criminals use violence as a means to achieve a specific end (Hoffman, 2017:38). 
However, even if the nature of the violence is similar (kidnapping, shooting or arson), 
the motivation is different and for terrorists, is usually political.  
On the global level, the UN is still struggling to advance a comprehensive term for 
terrorism since global powers such as the United States have previously labelled 
states such as the Republic of Iran as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ and continue to regard 
them as state sponsors of terrorism. Nonetheless, the UN’s 1999 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council 
Resolution 1566 (2004) provided a potential breakthrough in search of a working 
definition by providing a non-exhaustive definition of terrorism as: 
Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences 
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of 
a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to 
ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave 
nature … (United Nations, 2004) 
As with the AU, the UN definition is not concise or comprehensive. The above 
description makes it possible to include criminal networks such as the drug cartels in 
Mexico who indiscriminately kill civilians and government officials and continue to instil 
fear in the general populace. The rationale behind their brutal onslaught is to prevent 
state institutions such as the police from interfering in their drug trafficking operations. 
Should they be prosecuted under terrorism laws? Should not all deliberate targeting 




Notwithstanding the multifaceted nature of the term ‘terrorism’, a common thread is 
the threat of violence that seeks to cause psychological fear beyond its immediate 
victims. Although the concept is not exhaustive, it is crucial to narrate the various 
conceptualisations of the term by experts in the field, and how it has been 
operationalised by practitioners of counter-terrorism.   
  
2.7 Towards a comprehensive conceptualisation of terrorism 
Kiras (2013:175) defines terrorism as “the sustained use of violence against symbolic 
or civilian targets by small groups for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing 
widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or 
unsustainable response”.  
During the 1980s, renowned scholar on terrorism studies, Alex Schmid, attempted to 
arrive at an “Academic Consensus Definition” on terrorism by circulating 
questionnaires to various scholars. Collectively, 16 core elements were identified: 
Terrorism is an [1] anxiety-inspiring method of repeated [2] violent action, 
employed by (semi-) [3] clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for [4] 
idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination-
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The [5] immediate human 
victims of violence are generally chosen [6] randomly (targets of opportunity) or 
[7] selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and 
serve as message generators. [8] Threat-and violence-based [9] communication 
processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets 
are used to [10] manipulate the main target (audience (s)), turning it into a [11] 
target of terror, a [12] target of demands, or a [13] target of attention, depending 
on whether [14] intimidation, [15] coercion, or [16] propaganda is primarily 
sought. (Schmid, 2004:382) 
It is evident that the above definition has inflicts violence indiscriminately with the intent 
of communicating with a third party that is not directly affected by the violence. As with 
other definitions, this definition involves the objectives, the methods, the actors who 
carry out this act the general populace who are at the receiving end of this violence 




1974 indicated that “terrorism is theatre” (1974:4) and terrorist organisations such as 
the Islamic State have employed various media forms to display their acts of horror in 
an unprecedented manner.  
 
 
Screenshot of a video depicting the beheading of American-Israeli journalist, Steven 
Sotloff, by an Islamic State executioner ‘Jihadi John’ on 2 September 2014.  
Source: CNN, 2018 
 
The ultimate objective of such abhorrent executions is to engender fear and coerce a 
specific audience (usually states) to respond in a certain way. As political science 
academic, Akil Awan notes:  
Terrorists naturally benefit from media that inspires fear in a much larger target 
audience; they use it to turn a local event that affects a limited number of 
immediate victims into a global issue. And, unsavoury as it sounds, the media 
benefits from terrorist outrages too, most obviously by selling papers and winning 
audiences. (Awan, 2014:1) 
Although controversy remains, most states currently agree that the scourge and the 




there is more convergence than divergence on the matter. The definition of terrorism, 
therefore, becomes a matter of semantics for states that have formerly been 
oppressed and colonised by Western powers. States tend to comply with international 
conventions and initiatives that strive to detect, disrupt and dismantle terrorist activities 
wherever they may occur. In fact, for the first time, on 8 September 2006, all members 
of the UN concurred during the General Assembly with the strategic operational tenets 
in the adoption of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. If there is a global 
counter-terrorism strategy to combat terrorism, does this not imply that a consensus 
has been reached on what constitutes ‘terrorism’? Perhaps the debate on the 
conceptualisation of terrorism is more prevalent amongst scholars than amongst 
politicians and government bureaucrats. 
Having considered the various definitions of anti-terrorism proponents, it is also 
reasonable to investigate how ‘terrorists’ and their organisations perceive themselves. 
Do they consider themselves terrorists or victims of injustice? The following section 
provides a brief synopsis of the key utterances by terrorists on behalf of their 
organisations. 
 
2.8 A terrorist’s perspective on terrorism: Terrorist or freedom fighter? 
Undoubtedly, acts of terrorism such as beheading, assassination, mutilation and other 
brutal acts are unacceptable and abnormal and tend to create a heightened sense of 
(psychological) insecurity within the societies in which they occur (Crenshaw, 
2011:23). Is there justification for actions that cause panic, insecurity, disorientation 
and fear? Should a society affected by terrorism sympathise with the cause of the 
ideologue or condemn it? As presented by Hoffman (2017), the late Al-Qaeda leader, 
Osama bin Laden, explained the rationale behind their deeds during an interview in 
2002:  
America has made many accusations against us and many other Muslims 
around the world. Its change charge that we are carrying out acts of terrorism is 
an unwanted description …. [We act in] self-defense, in defense of our brothers 




to do that is terrorism, then let history be witness that we are terrorists. (Hoffman, 
2017:22) 
Hoffman (2017:23) also notes that a terrorist “will never acknowledge that he is a 
terrorist, and moreover will go to great lengths to evade and obscure any such 
inference or connection”. In addition, terrorists opt for names that do not denote 
‘terrorism’ because of the negativity associated with it. On the contrary, they prefer to 
be portrayed as: 
• “Freedom and liberation (e.g. the National Liberation Front, the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine, Freedom for the Basque Homeland); 
• Armies or other military organisational structures (e.g. the National Military 
Organization, the Popular Liberation Army, the Liberation Army Fifth 
Battalion); 
• Actual self-defence movements (e.g. the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the 
Shankhill Defence Association, the Organization for the Defence of the Free 
People, the Jewish Defense Organization); and 
• Righteous vengeance (e.g. the Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, the 
Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, the Palestinian Revenge 
Organization)” (Hoffman, 2017:22).  
It can be seen from the above self-descriptions that terrorists intrinsically disagree with 
the negative connotations that are generally applied to them. In fact, in his book, 
Invisible Armies, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Faddalah, spiritual leader of a Lebanese 
terrorist group, argues, “We don’t see ourselves as terrorists because we don’t believe 
in terrorism. We don’t see resisting the occupier as a terrorist action. We see ourselves 
as mujihadeen [holy warriors] who fight a Holy War for the people” (Hoffman, 2017:23-
24). 
What about the victims of their political violence? It is highly unlikely that they will 
sympathise with the perpetrators, regardless of their motives. As Martin (2019:15) 
observes, terrorists are well aware that they do not have the support of their victims 
but the “propaganda arising from the deed can help educate them”. For terrorists, the 
violence they inflict on innocent civilians is merely ‘collateral damage’ and a justifiable 




crucial to understand that the ultimate aim is not to defeat the opponent but to seek 
maximum publicity for their actions, thus prompting the state to respond or behave in 
a particular manner. 
In summary, it is critical to note that any attempt towards defining terrorism should 
consider the underlying causes of terrorism. Terrorism does not occur in a vacuum 
and nor should its actors be labelled ‘crazy’. The following section considers the 
causes of terrorism as discussed and analysed by various scholars. 
 
2.9 Causes of terrorist violence 
It is crucial to understand why a terrorist group’s ideology resonates with certain 
segments of society. As highlighted in the previous section, the deceased leader of 
Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, was adamant that members of his organisation were 
countering a form of injustice being inflicted upon them. This perceived injustice 
concerns the Western alliance involvement in protracted conflicts in predominantly 
Muslim nations such as Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and other nations in the Middle 
East. The existing literature on terrorism provides a plethora of motivations and 
justifications as to why terrorism occurs. For instance, Bjørgo (2005:3), an expert on 
terrorism, states that that there are four major causes of terrorism:  
1. “Structural causes (demographic imbalances, globalisation, rapid 
modernisation, transitional societies, increasing individualism with rootlessness 
and atomisation, relative deprivation, class structure, etc.) are causes that 
affect people’s lives in ways that they may or may not comprehend at an 
abstract macro level. 
2. Facilitator (or accelerator) causes make terrorism possible or attractive without 
being prime movers. Examples include the evolution of modern news media, 
transportation, weapons technology and weak state control of territory. 
Proponents of the so-called ‘ecology of terrorism thesis’ even claim that 
international terrorism occurs mainly because modern circumstances have 
made it exceptionally easy to employ terrorist methods. 
3. Motivational causes are the actual grievances that people experience at a 




sometimes able to translate causes from a structural level up to a motivational 
level, thereby moving people to act. The role of ideology and rhetoric is to 
explain how things really are and to persuade individuals and groups to take 
action. Motivational causes may also be seen as concrete ‘symptoms’ of more 
fundamental structural causes.  
4. Triggering causes are the direct precipitators of terrorist acts. They may be 
momentous or provocative events, a political calamity, an outrageous act 
committed by the enemy or some other event that calls for revenge or action. 
Even peace talks may trigger opponents of political compromise to carry out 
terrorist actions in order to undermine negotiations and discredit moderates” 
(Bjørgo, 2005:3). 
In view of the above, Crenshaw (2011:34) postulates that there are no universal 
triggers of terrorism and that “one does not find a general theoretical analysis of the 
causes of terrorism”. However, her analysis outlines four direct causes of terrorism in 
response to perceived injustice: (1) the existence of perceived injustice being 
committed against a minority group; (2) the absence of political freedom; (3) simmering 
tensions on an underlying issue; and (4) an event that catapults opposition forces to 
lose patience with the government of the day (Crenshaw, 2011:37-39). Similarly, 
Martin (2019:47) asserts that there is much disagreement amongst scholars of Political 
Science and Sociology about the socio-economic factors that may cause political 
violence. He draws attention to two sociological concepts (theories), that denote social 
conditions such as access to basic services, equal rights, freedom and other human 
developmental fundamentals that have the potential to improve an individual’s quality 
of life and immediate living environment. A society that is deprived of the above creates 
a breeding ground for terrorism to flourish (Martin, 2019:47). Both these theories have 
a striking similarity on the causes of terrorism as highlighted by Bjørgo (2005:3). 
What about the psychological explanations of terrorism? Are the assumptions posited 
by the victims of terrorism, experts and policymakers true that people who carry out 
acts of terrorism are mentally unstable, and that terrorism is associated with mental? 
(Martin, 2019:48). It is easy to arrive at such conclusions considering the violence 
committed by terrorists is inhumane and indiscriminate and is meant to cause fear 




on the rationality of terrorist violence. Consider the argument proffered by Crenshaw 
(2011:38):  
[M]any terrorists are young, well educated, and middle class in background. Such 
students or young professionals, with prior political experience, are disillusioned 
with the prospects of changing society and see little chance of access to the 
system despite their privileged status.  
Similarly, Martin (2019:49) outlines four general psychological explanations for 
terrorist violence: 
1. “Terrorism is simply a choice between violent and less violent alternatives. It is 
a rational selection of one methodology. 
2. Terrorism is a technique for maintaining group cohesion and focus. Group 
solidarity overcomes individualism. 
3. Terrorism is a necessary process to build the esteem of an oppressed people. 
Through terrorism, power is established over others, and the weak become 
strong. Attention itself becomes self-gratifying. 
4. Terrorists consider themselves an elite vanguard. They are not content to 
debate the issues because they have found a truth that needs no explanation. 
Action is superior to debate”. Martin (2019:49) 
Terrorism is seen as a last resort in an asymmetrical conflict where the perpetrators 
target buildings and civilians who are symbols of the system they attempt to annihilate, 
or reform. In most cases, the indiscriminate application of this violence is 
choreographed to communicate their grievances to government authorities in order to 
achieve a particular political objective. 
In short, psychological explanations provide the impetus for individuals or groups to 
join terrorist groups and carry out horrendous atrocities, labelling themselves ’freedom 
fighters’ fighting against a system that is unjust and that discriminates against a certain 
segment of society. An equally significant aspect is that various terrorist groups have 
different motivations, and these depend on the type of terrorist organisation. As 
discussed previously, Rapoport’s (2004) ‘Four Waves of Terrorism’ led to different 
types of terrorist organisations throughout the decades, each usually lasting a 




the balance’ of literature and analysis in favour of Western scholars who tend to be 
completely isolated from actual terrorist events and to observe events from a different 
lexicon. English (2016:11) observes the following:  
[T]he vast majority of researchers working on terrorism live and work in places 
where there exists comparatively little terrorism, while those places where 
terrorism tends to be most concentrated are ones from which very little terrorism 
scholarship is drawn.  
It is for these reasons that the following section invokes African scholar, Gani Yoroms 
(2007), who provide a synopsis of the typologies of terrorism.   
 
2.10 Typologies of terrorism 
Yoroms (2007:5) reinforces the ‘Four Waves of Terrorism’ presented by Rapoport 
(2004) on the categorisation of terrorism. Yoroms (2007:5) outlines the three 
typologies as follows: 
1. “Revolutionary Terrorism: Seeks to abolish an existing political system and 
replace it with a new system of political governance. 
2. Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism: Involves a group of terrorists that has been 
marginalised and seeks the reform of an existing structure to accommodate its 
interests. The ANC in South Africa was once said to be in this category. 
3. State Terrorism: Consists of states that sponsor terror against their citizens or 
against foreign governments when their national interests are under threat. The 
purpose is to defend and protect the values or interests that the state cherishes. 
These values can include the defence of a regime that is currently in power or 
protection of the corporate existence of the state as an entity”.  
It becomes evident from the above typologies how modern terrorism can be 
conceptualised. Although there is an overlap with the ‘Four Waves of Terrorism’, the 
analysis of Yoroms (2007:5) excludes the ‘religious wave’ that began in 1979 and was 
inspired by the Islamic Revolution of 1979. This wave spawned terrorist groups fighting 
in the name of Islam such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, now 




caliphate in the Muslim world. In contemporary Africa, the spread and influence of 
radical Islam has seen the emergence of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram that 
has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab that has pledged 
allegiance to Al-Qaeda and has caused havoc and mayhem in countries such as 
Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. This transnational political violence has created 
a serious human and national security challenge for African states dealing with the 
scourge of terrorism because terrorist groups have complete disregard for borders and 
issues of sovereignty.  
As previously mentioned, the current systematic campaign of violence is rooted in the 
‘fourth wave’, which is dominated by groups that are inspired or influenced by radical 
Islam. Terrorist organisations such as Al-Shabaab have murdered hundreds of 
innocent civilians in Kenya, Somalia and Uganda as they seek to abolish the current 
Western political system in Africa with their own ideological and religious system that 
is governed by Sharia law. The following section provides a brief overview of terrorism 
in Africa in general and discusses the terrorism landscape of Kenya and Tanzania, 
which are the focus of this study. 
 
2.11 Conceptual issues: Defining international regimes 
Similar to most concepts in the field of social science, the term ‘regime’ has not 
escaped the debate constellation and continues to be a concept under construction. 
As with most contentious terms such as terrorism, a somewhat common ground is 
established, and the term is applied in government policies, think tanks and institutions 
of higher learning. Strange (1982:479), one of the most vocal and critical scholars on 
the subject, expanded on this idea and narrated that the term ‘regime’ is “imprecise 
and woolly’”. Strange (1982:485) observes that the ambiguous nature of such 
concepts tends to be a double-edged sword in the sense that “where they do not 
actually mislead and misrepresent, they often serve to confuse and disorient us”. 
Susan Strange is not the only scholar in this academic onslaught of regimes. Young 
(1989:9) as cited in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2004:8) contends that the 
concept is used promiscuously to a point where it may lead to confusion rather than 




Despite these criticisms, various authors have provided operational definitions for 
‘regime’. Krasner (1982:2) defines regimes as: 
“Implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are 
standard of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are 
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”.  
Although the above definition may appear to be comprehensive, Young (1986:106) 
critiqued that:  
• “The problem with Krasner’s (1982) definition is that it does not allow us to 
identify regimes easily from IR; 
• Scholars have to cope with another set of ambiguous terms in the form of 
beliefs, standards, prescriptions and practices in addition to the original set 
consisting of principles, norms, rules and procedures; and 
• The concept inhibits a disconcerting elasticity when applied to the real world of 
IR”.  
The above challenges in regard to conceptualising ‘regime’ led scholars such as 
Keohane (1993:28) as cited in Hasenclever et al. (2004:20) to amend his original 
definition of regime:  
[A]greements in purely formal terms (explicit rules agreed upon by more than one 
state) and … [considering] regimes as rising when states recognize these 
agreements as having continuing validity …. [A] set of rules need not be 
‘effective’ to qualify as a regime, but it must be recognised as continuing to exist. 
Using this definition, regimes can be identified by the existence of explicit rules 
that are referred to in an affirmative manner by governments, even if they are 
necessarily scrupulously observed.  
It becomes evident that the above definition does not correspond with contemporary 
international regimes pertaining to global counter-terrorism and gives more credence 
to the realists’ interpretations of regimes as discussed earlier. Furthermore, Strange 




national security or the balance of power changes amongst the states that are involved 
in these international arrangements. As the following section demonstrates, great 
power interests played a crucial part in the formation of the international 
counter-terrorism regime. Since the concept of a regime forms a central part of this 
study, it is elaborated on in Chapter 3.  
 
2.12 Counter-terrorism: The genesis of a regime 
The preceding section provided the theoretical grounding of regimes as defined by 
various scholars and how the formation of international regimes may be understood. 
It is imperative to note that the theoretical framework of this study, the regime theory, 
has its roots in the neo-liberal theory of IR; “that is, its root assumptions is [sic] that 
states-and, for that matter firms, are rational egoists operating in an anarchical system” 
(Brown & Ainley, 2009:142). The preceding introductory chapter narrated that there is 
currently no full-scale counter-terrorism regime in the international system that states 
can adopt and implement in their respective sovereign jurisdictions. However, the 9/11 
attacks precipitated the emergence of a global counter-terrorism architecture 
negotiated amongst states through the UN and spearheaded by the United States as 
a global hegemon because of security threats posed to its homeland (Whitaker, 
2010:640). However, it is prudent to acknowledge that the global community of states 
has always converged on issues that pose an existential threat and have the potential 
to erode its legitimacy. Hence, the political appetite to cooperate with international 
treaties, conventions and agreements serves their respective interests in regard to 
political violence. From a regime theory-perspective, chapters 3 and 4 provide an 
in-depth analysis of the underlying rationale as to why states join regimes and the 
reasons why some comply, and others do not. This is the central thrust in answering 
the research questions and addressing the problem statement of this study. The 
following section provides an description of the terrorism landscape of the African 
continent with a focus on the major terrorist organisations. Furthermore, a general 







2.13 The context of terrorism in Africa 
In May 2000, The Economist ran a front cover entitled, ‘The Hopeless Continent’, 
narrating Africa’s perpetual problems with systemic corruption, insecurity caused by 
rebels, unending cases of Malaria and HIV/AIDS, grinding poverty, poor education and 
unremitting unemployment. By this time, Africa had already experienced two major 
terror attacks in August 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania, the simultaneous bombing of 
the United States Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam that killed more than 224 
people and injured more than 4574 (CNN, 2018). In addition, the security and political 
vacuum in countries such as Somalia and other ungoverned spaces on the continent 
and the ongoing presence of rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo continues to 
provide a negative outlook from a security perspective for Africa.  
The African continent has not escaped the wrath of international terrorism. In fact, 
countries such as Sudan have hosted international terrorist organisations such as 
Al-Qaeda and their leader, Osama bin Laden, and provided a safe haven to set up 
training camps. Today, the threat of terrorism is more pervasive than ever as “attacks 
are occurring not just in the older centres of activity such as Somalia, northern Nigeria 
and northern Mali, but in emerging hotspots like northern Mozambique and Burkina 
Faso as well” (Mahmood, 2019:1). 
As the literature reviewed in this chapter pointed out, the target of terrorists goes 
beyond the immediate victims and is usually directed at state actors in order to 
communicate a message and ultimately influence government policy. The bombings 
in Kenya and Tanzania were not directed at these specific countries or their citizens 
but at the United States government and its interests within the diaspora. In addition, 
Al-Qaeda’s declaration of war on the United States transcended the group’s reach to 
new heights. The 1998 major attacks on African soil, a prelude to the September 11 
attacks, catapulted the organisation’s global outreach and appealed to like-minded 
extremist organisations. Consequently, the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ compelled 
African states to formulate a plethora of legal instruments to combat terrorism, 
terrorism financing and money laundering. Although the continent had its share of 
protracted conflicts, the prevalence of religious terrorism and casualties of terrorist 




organisations such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia have spread 
their reign of terror to neighbouring states such as Kenya, Chad, Uganda and 
Cameroon. Ankomah (2014:1) attests: 
From the east, in Somalia, where al-Shabaab has been laying waste to human 
life and property all the way into Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, to Nigeria where 
Boko Haram thinks boarding school children are legitimate targets of attack in 
addition to the indiscriminate murder of civilians, to the Maghreb and Sahel 
countries where Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates and 
competitors have gone as far as launching a full-scale hot war in Mali after years 
of attacks in Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Chad, the definition of a ‘terrorist’ on 
the continent has changed dramatically from how Mrs Thatcher and Mr Reagan 
saw it in their day, to a dangerous extremist prepared to kill, maim and destroy. 
Unlike the African continent’s rebel movements of the 1980s and 1990s that were 
preoccupied with occupying and controlling territory, contemporary terrorist 
organisations do not exist on a map; they have no known physical headquarters and 
more dangerously, they easily blend into societies. The kidnapping of more than 200 
girls by Boko Haram in the northern town of Chibok in April 2014 received international 
attention and condemnation and prompted viral social media demands such as ‘Bring 
Back Our Girls’. The vulnerability of African states to terrorism is attributed to a 
multiplicity of factors. According to Solomon (2015:7), a key factor is Africa’s 
“ungoverned spaces” where the state’s sphere of physical governance does not 
extend to rural and rough terrains. The concerns highlighted previously by The 
Economist provides a synopsis of the various challenges facing Africa and the role 
they play in fuelling the scourge of contemporary terrorism. Yoroms (2007:13) 
expounds that identity politics plays a crucial role towards understanding the dynamics 
of terrorism and terrorism activism because of the fear and hate it triggers, the support 
it receives and the desperation with which it is carried out in Africa. Yoroms (2007:12) 
adds that “most African states are poor at managing differences, because the 
managers themselves live in fear of the people and tend to build up regime security 
rather than human security”.  
To conclude this segment, it is crucial to recall that terrorism in Africa has always been 




the Cold War, and the ideological leanings of most African states were in support of 
the Soviet Union and any other nation that supported their anti-colonial stance 
regarding minority regimes. The advent of colonialism and apartheid in Africa 
witnessed the emergence of organised political formations that were determined 
diplomatically and militarily to liberate themselves from the yoke of foreign occupation. 
To quell resistance, occupying forces resorted to labelling liberation movements as 
‘terrorists’, often confronting them with brutal force backed by counter-terrorism 
legislation during the colonial period. The subsequent section delves into the terrorism 
landscape of the selected case studies, highlighting the nature of the terrorism threat 
faced by these states. 
 
2.14 Kenya, Tanzania and the Global War on Terrorism 
The existing literature on terrorist attacks in. Africa evokes Rapoport’s (2011) 
categorisation of the ‘four waves’ phenomenon that was referred to on earlier in this 
chapter. In contemporary usage, the ‘religious wave’ refers to terrorism influenced or 
conducted on the premise of religious beliefs or ideologies. The dominant scholarship 
on contemporary terrorism studies on the African continent starts with the bombings 
of the U.S. embassies in the capital cities of Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. As 
previously mentioned in Chapter 1, these terror attacks culminated in the killing of 224 
people and the injuring of 4 574 people. Nonetheless, the terrorist landscapes of the 
two case studies were fundamentally different although both were victims of a terrorist 
onslaught by the same terrorist organisation, Al-Qaeda. As narrated in Chapter 4, both 
states have been plagued by inter-community political violence, which often has 
nothing to do with elements of contemporary terrorism but rather perceived 
marginalisation and socio-economic issues that have fuelled the level of discontent 
amongst affected communities. A review of the existing literature indicates that 
Al-Shabaab poses the greatest threat to internal security and stability for Kenya and 
Tanzania because of its regional ambitions and links to international terrorist networks 
such as Al-Qaeda. It is for the above reasons that Bryden and Bahra (2019:1) posit: 
“Historically, the threat of terrorism in the region has been at its most acute when 
three main strands of jihadism—Somali, East African, and global—have 




organizational host; East African extremists provide the foot soldiers who can 
operate most effectively across the wider region; and al-Qaeda provides the 
ideological legitimacy and global appeal. The 1998 suicide bombings of the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing over 220 people and wounding 
thousands more, were the work of just such a triad: al-Qaeda, the Somali jihadi 
group al-Ittihad al-Islami, and a network of Kenyan extremists that later came to 
be known as al-Hijra. So, too, were the bombing of a tourist resort near Mombasa 
and attempted shooting down of an Israeli passenger jet in 2002”. Bryden and 
Bahra (2019:1) 
Based on the above contextualisation of the terrorism threat faced by Kenya and 
Tanzania, Chapter 4 of this study provides a detailed overview of the terrorism 
landscape of these states and the policy responses undertaken to thwart and manage 
the threat. The following section provides an analysis of the theoretical debate around 
terrorism by delving into the existing gaps and providing a positive and a negative 
critique on the key issues. 
 
2.15 Analysis of literature 
This section provides a synopsis of the main ideas, arguments, findings and 
conclusions regarding terrorism research. As mentioned previously, the literature on 
terrorism is extensive and draws authors from a variety of academic disciplines, 
including Psychology, History, Economics, Politics, Sociology and Linguistics. A 
common theme in the literature is that most scholars, regardless of their academic 
orientation or leanings, concur on the salient issues such as definition of terrorism and 
its main attributes; there is no divergence of opinion that terrorism as a form of protest 
and political violence is abhorrent and unjust. The positive aspect of this convergence 
of opinion is that it provides a departure point for conceptualising terrorism and 
demonstrating how terrorism has evolved over time. In addition, some scholars have 
conducted extensive research that guides governments and policymakers in their 
decision-making on matters pertaining to human and national security. Since the 
attacks on 11 September 2001, more scholars have entered the field of terrorism, 
which can only broaden and enrich terrorism research and perhaps provide answers 




The definitional contestation of ‘terrorism’ has led some to suggest that terrorism 
should be considered a matter of perception since the actors and methods tend to be 
constructed in a pejorative manner. Notwithstanding the above debate, the positive 
aspect of the literature is the chronology of how terrorism and its types have evolved 
over time. The historiography provides a background on the methods, ideologies and 
tactics employed by terrorists and how they have influenced contemporary terrorist 
groups such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. The definitional debate regarding regimes 
and their formation is that it hardly originates from small states. The literature on 
regimes denote an international system in which great powers impose their hegemony 
on less powerful states to participate in conventions, treaties and agreements that tend 
to have minimal impact on the states’ ability to govern their territories (Smith, Hadfield 
& Dunne, 2016:41). The various norms and principles underpinning these regimes, no 
matter how well intended, may be altered if they no longer serve the purpose of the 
hegemon.  
From a critical point of view, one cannot ignore the hard-hitting criticism in the field of 
terrorism research by Sageman (2014:576) when he asserted, “[W]e have a system 
of terrorism research in which intelligence analysts know everything but understand 
nothing, while academics understand everything but know nothing”. The above 
description of terrorism research refers to the existing gap that experts in the field such 
as Sageman and others experience. They may have access to primary data on 
terrorism (e.g. interviewing terror suspects in government facilities) but may not use 
the data for ethical concerns since the data are classified and non-disclosure 
agreements may have been signed.  
Another shortcoming of the literature is that it seldom accounts for the views of the 
victims of terrorism or of the general public. How do they fit into the equation of political 
violence? Are they mere victims whose opinion on the matter should be dismissed? 
This failure of imagination by scholars creates a deficit in terms of widening the anti-
terrorism network and provides a monopoly of counter-terrorism policies and 
strategies by scholars and government bureaucrats. In any democracy, consultation 
on issues that affect people’s wellbeing is important and hence, the involvement of the 
general populace in counter-terrorism measures is paramount. The main gap in 
terrorism literature is the causes of terrorism. The scholarship provides a plethora of 




previous chapter of this study highlighted the potential dangers of interviewing 
terrorists and the ethical constraints placed on scholars commissioned to engage with 
terrorists. Nonetheless, many gaps in terrorism research may be uncovered if some 
of these interviews were declassified. 
The above dilemma points to Sageman’s (2014:576) analogy on the 
practitioner / academic divide and how it inhibits terrorism research. For these and 
other reasons, future research on terrorism, especially the empirical causes thereof, 
is crucial towards contributing towards the existing body of knowledge. Governments 
should share more with academia without compromising national security, and 
academia should avail their methodological rigour to practitioners in the field for better 
and sound analysis. 
 
2.16 Concluding remarks 
The conceptual review in this chapter introduced various salient issues regarding the 
study of terrorism by providing a general overview of the history, understanding and 
definition of the concept. In addition, it provided a brief synopsis of the terrorism 
landscapes of Kenya and Tanzania and the genesis of the counter-terrorism regime 
that this study sought to investigate. Furthermore, the chapter examined the existing 
literature and key debates of experts in the field regarding the causes of terrorism and 
the key issues underpinning its development in Africa. The preceding section provided 
the positive aspects and the shortcomings of the existing literature on terrorism 
research and how these may be overcome. The application of ‘one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter’ has somewhat dissipated within the African context 
since the anti-colonial struggle ended during the early 1990s for the majority of African 
states. Although the debate still lingers, a general consensus on the key elements or 
attributes pertaining to what constitutes ‘terrorism’ and how to combat it provides the 
impetus for a legal framework and a counter-terrorism strategy for the international 
community of states.  
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework for the international counter-terrorism 
regime from a ‘regime theory’ perspective and highlights the origin and rationale 




study aimed to contribute to the existing literature on the formation of security regimes 
and to provide explanations why certain countries may comply or not comply with the 
principles and norms of a regime. Furthermore, the chapter provides an overview of 










Chapter 1 provided a conceptualisation of ‘regimes’ and a brief background on how 
international counter-terrorism regime has evolved. Chapter 2 provided a conceptual 
grounding on the salient issues pertaining to terrorism by covering the fierce academic 
discussion on deconstructing ‘terrorism’, the historiography, the causes of terrorist 
violence, and the modus operandi and accompanying ideological inclinations of 
terrorists. Furthermore, the literature review indicated a robust debate amongst 
scholars in the field of terrorism regarding whether states can commit acts of terrorism 
and if yes, under which conditions. Nonetheless, the various theoretical interpretations 
of the concept of terrorism provided a consensus amongst scholars and government 
policymakers that terrorism is committed by individuals, and groups with specific 
political objectives in mind. The chapter highlighted that the individuals and groups 
that carry out political violence tend to be highly rational actors and are not ‘mad men’. 
Additionally, the literature provided a dichotomy between criminal groups and terrorist 
organisations in terms of their purpose and motivations. More importantly, Chapter 2 
provided a critique in terms of the gaps in terrorism research and how they may be 
resolved. 
This chapter provides the central theoretical tenets underpinning regime theory and 
indicates the key assumptions developed by the major strands of IR, namely liberal 
institutionalism and realism. The academic discipline of IR has a plethora of theories 
that attempt to explain, predict and understand global political dynamics and events. 
Regime theory aims to explain the conditions under which states in the international 
system tend to cooperate or deviate from norms set by international institutions or 
great powers. Chapter 3 theoretically unpacks the context and functions of 
international regimes and provides a critique of its effectiveness as argued by various 
scholars emanating from the above-mentioned schools of thought. The key theoretical 
issues pertaining to compliance with international obligations such as the international 




international and the African counter-terrorism regimes and how compliance of its 
members was shaped and influenced is provided.  
Moreover, the theoretical framework (regime theory) served as the broad analytical 
anchor for the development of the counter-terrorism regime. The specific political 
factors mentioned in the article by Whitaker (2010) upon which the two case studies 
were analysed are examined in Chapter 4.  
 
3.2 Competing theories of regime formations 
Chapter 2 provided the conceptual framing of regimes as postulated by various 
scholars in the field and demonstrated how the discipline has evolved over time. It is 
crucial to note that neo-liberal theories of regimes dominate the analysis of regimes 
(Hasenclever et al., 2004:4). In order to achieve the objectives of this study, regime 
theory provided the fundamental theoretical tenets around the formation of regimes 
and was crucial in explaining how institutions are formed around a specific issue area 
such as the counter-terrorism regime and its implication for the countries under 
investigation.  
Hence, this section commences by dissecting the key assumptions regarding regimes 
as analysed by two schools of thought “within the study of international regimes: 
realists who focus on power relationships; and neoliberals, who base their analyses 
on constellations of interests” (Hasenclever et al., 2004:1-2). Little (2014:224) 
observes that liberal institutionalists and realists agree that regimes are necessary 
within the international system because of the anarchical structure of the international 
system. Therefore, states will find common ground to form regimes to confront various 
challenges in global matters that may affect global stability. Although this may be true, 
the above-mentioned theories have constructed “very different theoretical 
assessments of regimes” (Little, 2014:224).  
 
3.3 The liberal institutionalist approach 
For neo-liberals, international regimes are crucial in achieving common interests. A 




mutually beneficial cooperation-within and amongst states” (Keohane, 2012:126). In 
addition, such cooperation provides the impetus for a world that is more peaceful and 
promotes human security and human welfare (Keohane, 2012:126). More simply, 
individual states are perceived as rational egoists who care only for their own 
(absolute) gains (Hasenclever et al., 2004:3). Brown and Ainley (2009:142) contend 
that because of these gains, “it is not too difficult to see why states (and firms) would 
want to co-operate: there are absolute gains to be had from co-operation-, that is, from 
mutual adjustments; and on neo-liberal assumptions, states are concerned to make 
absolute gains”.  
More importantly, the neo-liberal school of thought on regimes posits that cooperation 
is determined by power relationships amongst states (Hasenclever et al, 2004:26). At 
the same time, the ‘hegemonic stability theory’ holds that powerful actors in the 
international system tend to seek dominance over global affairs by establishing some 
form of international order within an international society that is primarily anarchic 
(Smith et al., 2016:41). Furthermore, the theory “seeks to explain how cooperation can 
emerge among major powers and how international orders, comprising rules, norms, 
and institutions, emerge and are sustained” (Smith et al., 2016:41). 
It, therefore, becomes evident that the theory of hegemonic stability attempts to 
explain why regimes persist to the extent that they do. The United States as a benign 
actor in the international system is able to use its preponderance of power for the 
formation and maintenance of and compliance with international regimes. As was 
noted in Chapter 2, the emergence of the international counter-terrorism regime was 
driven by the United States and operationalised through a global institution (the UN). 
It is important to note that both realists and liberals consider regimes to be the “product 
of rational self-interested actors” (Little, 2014:220). Despite these similarities in 
worldviews of regimes, liberals differ from realists regarding the global significance of 
institutions. For liberals, institutions are crucial in two respects. Firstly, they may be 
more or less effective and secondly, they may be more or less robust (or resilient) 
(Hasenclever et al, 2004:2). Put differently, liberals assess the effectiveness of a 
regime by measuring the extent to which states comply with the key norms and 
provisions of the regime and the extent to which these norms and rules can achieve 




Key in liberal thought is the ability of regimes to address failures in world politics in a 
variety of issue areas (Keohane, 1982:335). Since states are interest driven, they will 
seek cooperation and coordination on issues where there are relative gains to be 
made since they do not perceive the realm of international politics to be a zero-sum 
game. Predictably, realist thinkers contest the liberal institutionalist approach in 
respect to regimes because of their fundamental divergence on global issues 
generally.  Little (2014:219) argues that: “Realists are often sceptical of or uninterested 
in international law, and yet they have developed an important position on regimes”. 
As the following section demonstrates, realist thought is more concerned with the 
distribution of power within the international system and the dominance of a hegemon 
in global regimes. 
 
3.4 The realist approach 
Contrary to the liberal approach to regimes, realists have a rather pessimistic outlook 
on international institutions and their accompanying agreements, rules and 
regulations. As a research programme in IR, realism is anchored on the assumption 
that the international system within which states operate is highly anarchic as there is 
no global government and that there is no higher authority than the state. In other 
words, the state is the dominant actor in global affairs. (Jackson & Sørensen, 
2016:63). More importantly, the authors describe the realist’s stance as follows:  
All international agreements are provisional and conditional on the willingness of 
states to observe them. All states must be prepared to sacrifice their international 
obligations on the altar of their own self-interest if the two come into conflict. That 
makes treaties and all other agreements, conventions, customs, rules, laws and 
so on between states merely expedient arrangements which can and will be set 
aside if they conflict with the vital interests of states. There are no international 
obligations in the moral sense of the world- i.e., bonds of mutual duty-between 
independent states. (Jackson & Sørensen, 2016:63) 
As it was mentioned previously, realist thought perceives international institutions as 
a mere reflection of the distribution of power in the international system. Furthermore, 




behaviour and interests, having conducted a cost-benefit analysis. Hence, realists 
conclude that institutions are not instruments of peace in an international society that 
is anarchic (Mearsheimer, 1994:7). In his critique of liberal institutionalism, 
Mearsheimer (1994:12) opines that cooperation on the international stage is hindered 
by two factors, namely relative-gains considerations and the possibility of cheating by 
states. Since realist thinking is primary concerned with the distribution of power, states 
must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns, which denotes a scenario 
where each side is not only concerned about individual gain but also how well it does 
compared with the other side when considering cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1994:12). 
Within the study of regimes, Waltz (1988:621) asserts that in alliances amongst 
unequals, partnership pioneers have little concern for the dedication of their adherents 
who ordinarily have minimal choice with regard to cooperating and complying on 
specific issue areas. Again, the formation and maintenance of regimes is highly 
dependent on powerful states that seek to project power, expand their sphere of 
influence and promote their interests. 
The above section provided an overview of the two main schools of thought that 
underpin regime theory, more specifically, the rationale behind their establishment and 
the conditions under which they are maintained by a hegemon. The following section 
delves into the process, functions, stages and various types of regimes, which serve 
as the analytical tool discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
3.5 Classifying regimes 
The previous sections provided an overview of the diverging ideological inclinations of 
the two dominant strands of IR on regimes and how they are formed in the international 
system. Levy, Young and Zürn (1995:268) assert that the primary analytical concern 
of regime analysis is to demonstrate to the neorealist school of thought that institutions 
and their accompanying agreements matter in the theory of international politics. In 
other words, the departing premise that institutions can promote peace in an 
international anarchic system is the preoccupation of regime analysis. However, 
certain conditions or provisions must be in place before any deliberations on the 
existence of international regimes can occur (Levy et al., 1995:271-272). Furthermore, 




assessment of the degree to which the expectations of actors converge (Levy et al., 
1995:272). Similarly, Little (2014:222) observes that a regime may come into existence 
either with or without a formalised agreement. It is for the above reasons that Levy et 
al. (1995:272) constructed a matrix on the typologies of regimes: 
• “Dead letter regimes: Existence of explicit rules including both substantive and 
procedural prescriptions articulated in written form; may or may not be legally 
binding. 
• Tacit regimes: Cases in which regular but implicit reference to informal rules 
are common together with behaviour that is consistent with certain 
independently inferred rules. 
• Classic regimes: Exist in issue areas where in addition to explicit rules and 
regular reference to them, rule-consistent behaviour is widespread. 
Rule-consistent behaviour is inferred when (1) clear violations remain the 
exception; (2) parties harmed by violations protest against them by implicitly or 
explicitly referring to the agreed-upon rules; and (3) violators do not deny the 
rules and norms referred to in these protests” (Levy et al., 1995:272). 
 
Table 3.1: Convergence of expectations 
Formality Low High 
Low No regimes Tacit regimes 
High Dead letter regimes Classic regimes 
Source: Levy et al. (1995) 
 
3.6 The context and functions of regimes 
Chapter 2 provided a brief theoretical overview of the classification of regimes in world 
politics, which covers a host of global concerns in specific issue areas such as security, 
economics and the environment. This section delves into the critical topic of regime 
analysis, namely the functions of regimes and the factors influencing compliance, 
which is the focus of this study. As suggested at some length in this chapter, regime 
formation does not evolve in isolation but has its genesis in the interests of the great 




on international politics have always considered major regimes control-orientated yet 
there are only a few cases of mutual-control regimes. Furthermore, Keohane 
(1982:352) observes that  
“two features of the international context are particularly important: world politics 
lacks authoritative governmental institutions and is characterised by pervasive 
uncertainty. Within this setting, a major function of international regimes is to 
facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements amongst governments, 
so that the structural condition of anarchy does not lead to complete ‘war of all 
against all’. (Keohane, 1982:352) 
Regarding the realists’ claim that regimes are primarily concerned with power, Strange 
(1982:495) observes that “asking what are the key bargains that have been made or 
could conceivably be made in the future-and how they have affected outcomes will 
reveal rather more about the real levers of power in the system than attention to 
regimes”. Put differently, issues pertaining to compliance and regime maintenance 
cannot be analysed without the involvement of the dominant actor or hegemon in the 
regime, or as Keohane (1982:330) declares, an “imposed regime agreed upon within 
constraints that are mandated by powerful actors”.  
However, a further point needs to be considered. The nature of global insecurity 
stemming from international terrorism, money laundering, human and drug trafficking 
may lure states to demand regimes even though they are not the driving force behind 
them. Weak and developing states have the impetus to join and cooperate with 
regimes because the benefits of joining may outweigh the costs of not doing so. 
Furthermore, the states may not need to be burdened with the transactional costs of 
the regime since this may be covered by the hegemon or other strong states. Knowing 
this as a possible reason as to why states demand regimes, outlining the functions of 
regimes as articulated by Keohane (1982:333) becomes crucial.  
Firstly, regimes pave the way for the establishment of negotiated norms on a specific 
international issue (the environment or nuclear weapons). For example, the 
criminalisation of terrorist activities and the financing thereof by the CTC of the UN 
created in 2001 compels member states to enact domestic legislation to combat 
terrorism. Secondly, “international regimes help to make governments expectations 




regimes so that they may benefit from agreements that would have been impossible 
to negotiate outside the context of the regime. An equally significant aspect of regime 
analysis is the stages of regime formation, which Levy et al. (1995:282) observe 
should be “best thought of as analytic rather than concrete in character”. That is, not 
all regimes will constitute all the elements of formation but may comprise one or two 
on a case-to-case basis.  
 
3.7 The stages of regime formation 
As instruments of cooperative behaviour that facilitate cooperation (Haggard & 
Simmons, 1987:495), regime scholars have developed six major analytical issues in 
the study of regime formation: “behaviour of the actors in regime formation; process 
of regime formation; stages of regime formation; driving social forces; cross-cutting 
factors; and multivariate models” (Levy et al., 1995:280). To achieve the objectives of 
this study, the stages of regime formation were crucial towards understanding the 
development of the international counter-terrorism regime because they delve directly 
into the intricacies of how regimes are formed and how they relate to the two dominant 
IR theories of realism and neo-liberalism.  
Firstly, agenda formation encompasses a process in which issues of international 
concern are identified and problems are defined and prioritised in international forums. 
The second stage is institutional choice whereby consensus is reached on the key 
provisions of the regime with which member states are expected to comply. Finally, 
the operational stage includes the actions or steps taken towards realising the 
objectives and goals set by members of the regime (Levy et al., 1995:282). This stage 
requires the mobilisation of resources that may lead to the establishment of institutions 
that will be tasked to ensure compliance with the broad and specific provisions of the 
regime. It is important to note that non-state actors such as businesses and non-
governmental organisations will be expected to comply if the regime requires member 





The following section deals with the main theoretical crux of this study: the issue of 
compliance and the reasons why states tend to or do not comply with international 
agreements or treaties.  
 
3.8 Compliance: A global perspective 
International cooperation on issues of global significance requires commitment from 
members who have signed up to be part of a regime. Therefore, compliance with the 
key provisions of a regime is crucial towards realising the fundamental norms and 
principles for which the members or the great powers signed up. Despite the 
remarkable interest in studying compliance under the umbrella of international 
agreements, the effort to link theory with evidence is still in its infancy due to the 
difficulty in defining and measuring compliance (Simmons, 1998:77). This is because 
of the various academic disciplines that apply different methods of analysis, reasoning 
and standards of proof (Simmons, 1998:77). The following section investigates the key 
considerations that compel states to comply or not to comply with international 
commitments.  
 
3.9 Factors influencing compliance and non-compliance 
McLaughlin & Hensel (2007:722) observe that the “ultimate litmus test of cooperation 
and compliance theories occurs in situations where states’ interests are directly 
opposed, such as competing interstate claims over territory, maritime areas, and 
cross-border rivers”. As the preceding sections suggested, great powers play a 
fundamental role in the establishment of regimes, and the two dominant IR theories of 
liberalism and realism provide the theoretical assumptions behind the formation, 
maintenance and transformation of regimes. The literature on compliance provides a 
myriad of reasons why states tend to comply or do not comply with international 
obligations. The study draws on some of the pertinent considerations that relate 
directly to the objectives of the study in order to provide context. To achieve this, the 
study adopted the four political factors outlined in Beth Whitaker’s (2010) journal article 
titled, ‘Compliance among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime’ to 




Kenya and Tanzania with the international counter-terrorism regime. It is important to 
note that there have been significant changes in the counter-terrorism landscape of 
Kenya and Tanzania since the article of Whitaker (2010) was authored.  
 
3.9.1 Financial resources 
Decisions to join international regimes usually come at a cost for participating states. 
It is for this reason that Chayes and Chayes (1993:178) argue that individuals or 
organisations will conduct an economic or policy analysis to conserve financial and 
other resources for more pressing needs. That is to say, small or developing states 
may be reluctant to comply with international commitments because of financial 
constraints. Urgent matters engulfing the developing world such as drought, poverty, 
unemployment and disease are considered more pressing than complying with global 
regimes, which will divert much needed resources.  
For instance, Stiles and Thayne (2006:156) assert that “while vulnerability makes a 
state more inclined to submit to international pressure, it is possible to be too weak to 
comply with international law”. However, global hegemons will dedicate financial 
resources to ensure compliance by small states in order to combat terrorism. Apart 
from financial resources dedicated towards counter-terrorism initiatives such as police 
training, capacity building and technical assistance with passing counter-terrorism 
legislation, Whitaker (2010:647) contends that an appetite to comply with counter-
terrorism can be external to the regime. Put differently, a state may comply with a 
regime that is spearheaded by powerful actors because it will receive aid in areas that 
it deems paramount (education, health, housing, etc.).  
 
3.9.2 Interests and the perceived threat of terrorism 
The previous chapter examined in-depth the various conceptualisations of terrorism 
and its historical context. This demonstrated that many countries in the developing 
world provided a safe haven or were sympathetic towards international terrorist 




themselves were waging anti-colonial wars against the great powers of the West 
before and during the Cold War. As Whitaker (2010:645) observes  
[O]ne reason that a government may comply with the international counter-
terrorism regime is that its leaders believe their country is a possible target. The 
more threatened leaders feel (whether by terrorists or by political opponents), the 
more likely they are to implement counter-terrorism measures.  
Similarly, Krasner (1999) as cited in Stiles and Thayne (2006:154) contends that 
“states generally behave in a manner that leaders perceive to be in the best interests 
of the nation and best ensure their own survival”. The above gives credence to the key 
realist assumptions about state behaviour in the international system. However, states 
may find it difficult to implement a regime if complying with it means having trouble 
within its social and political institutions. Chayes and Chayes (1993:183) summarise 
as follows:  
From the point of view of the particular interests of any state, the outcome may 
fall short of the ideal. But if the agreement is well designed, sensible, 
comprehensible, and with a practical eye to probable patterns of conduct and 
interaction-compliance problems and enforcement issues are likely to be 
manageable. If issues of noncompliance and enforcement are endemic, the real 
problem is likely to be that the original bargain did not adequately reflect the 
interests of those that would be living under it, rather than mere disobedience. 
Based on the above, one would expect compliance to be high amongst countries that 
have experienced incidents of terrorism because their interests and expectations 
would converge with that of the counter-terrorism regime. In fact, the member state 
may exploit the provisions of the regime “to justify, legitimate, and strengthen its own 
anti-terrorism efforts” (Whitaker, 2010:646). However, for states that have not suffered 
the wrath of domestic or international terrorism, the incentive to comply may be 
reduced in order to focus on other domestic priorities. Boutton (2014:742) argues that 
countries such as the United States provide aid in the fight against terrorism because 
of their strategic interests in the recipient states even if they know funds may be 
misappropriated or channelled towards other causes. More pointedly, it is the 
assertion of Boutton (2014:742) that a domestic security threat such as terrorism may 




assistance to combat terrorist activities within their borders. Regarding the issue of 
compliance in the developing world, Boutton (2014:742) further observes that  
African countries were aware of the strategic motives driving Western aid 
allocation and knew that the threat to withdraw aid if they did not comply was 
usually an empty one. As a result, they promised to implement democratic 
reforms, accepted the aid, and then reneged on their promises.  
Generally, compliance in countries that are heavily dependent on foreign aid will be 
much higher compared with those that do not (Whitaker, 2010:648). Self-interest and 
funding are important factors to consider regarding compliance with a regime, but local 
political dynamics such as institutions of the state are equally important. 
 
3.9.3 Domestic political institutions 
The literature on the compliance of states with international commitments identifies 
local political institutions as a pivotal factor. Given that contemporary states have 
different political systems, it becomes essential to recognise that the respective organs 
of the state such as the legislature and judiciary will have a different type of influence 
and role towards honouring international agreements. For instance, Stiles and Thayne 
(2006:156) argue that a democratic state is more likely to comply with contentious 
issues in international law for ideological and cultural reasons. One of these reasons 
could be political pressure from opposition parties for the government to comply with 
international commitments. On the contrary, political debate in the legislature may stall 
ratification or implementation of international agreements since opposition parties 
have a propensity to oppose motions or laws brought forward by the governing party 
(Weiss, 1999 as cited by Stiles & Thayne, 2006:157).  
Similarly, Whitaker (2010:648) contends that autocratic regimes may find it easier to 
comply with international agreements in certain areas due to the absence of political 
opponents. The author adds that “there have been contradictory findings as to whether 
democratic institutions increase or decrease compliance with international 
agreements” (Whitaker, 2010:649). Based on the above, it becomes evident that 
compliance will differ from state to state regardless of the type of political system. 




standard, a social norm, or any other behavioural prescription does not guarantee that 
those subject to it will actually comply with it”. On the issue of compliance, the various 
competing domestic institutions are closely related to the domestic political institutions. 
These are discussed briefly in the following section.  
 
3.9.4 Competing domestic constituencies 
On a global level, the issue of terrorism and counter-terrorism has evoked a variety of 
responses from individuals, groups and institutions that are directly and indirectly 
affected by it. On one end of the spectrum, government agencies have embarked upon 
counter-terrorism measures that include equipping the various security clusters with 
the necessary training and resources (financial and physical) and legislation that at 
times curtails civil liberties. These are the constituencies that will most likely comply 
with the counter-terrorism regime (Whitaker, 2010:649). Non-compliant constituencies 
consist of groups that will be negatively affected by counter-terrorism measures. 
These groups may include ordinary citizens, “human rights advocates, lawyers 
concerned about constitutional issues, and individuals who expect to be targeted 
(Muslim populations in many countries, for example)” (Whitaker, 2010:650).  
British philosopher, Grayling (2010:19) observes that the application of intrusive 
surveillance and control measures by the state is predicated on the assumption that 
every citizen is a “potential suspect and must be treated as such”. In the United States, 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks witnessed the promulgation of an intrusive 
counter-terrorism legislation called “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA 
Patriot Act of 2001)” (Martin, 2019:241). As expected, the provisions of this legislation 
were heavily criticised by civil liberties watchdog organisations because the Act 
included provisions such as granting security agencies sweeping powers to intercept 
email and telephonic conversations as well engaging in rendition where terror 
suspects were detained and interrogated in foreign countries without trial. (Martin, 
2019:241).  
Constituents who tend to oppose governmental attempts at encroaching on civil 




world but have emerged and continue to spread in the developing world. Hence, this 
constituency’s ability to apply pressure on states that are determined to implement 
provisions of the counter-terrorism cannot be underestimated.  
In addition to the above-mentioned factors that influence compliance with the norms 
and principles of the regime, Chayes and Chayes (1993:187) highlight three 
circumstances under which a state may not intentionally comply with a regime: (1) the  
language of the regime is vague; (2) constraints faced by members (technical 
capacity); and (3) the various temporary changes that regimes take as a consequence 
of external. Furthermore, and of paramount importance is the assertion that a “state 
may be ‘in compliance’ when it has taken the formal legislative and administrative 
steps, and, despite the vagaries of legislative and domestic politics, it is perhaps 
appropriate to hold it accountable for failure to do so” (Chayes & Chayes, 1993:194).  
As previously mentioned, there is no overarching counter-terrorism regime with which 
member states of the UN should comply, but the domestication of counter-terrorism 
legislation is the cornerstone of the regime as it seeks to criminalise all terrorist-related 
activities. For the most part, hard-core aspects addressed at combating terrorism such 
as training, intelligence sharing, and policing are usually pursued on a bilateral or 
regional basis. Nevertheless, Chayes and Chayes (1993:198) argue that “an 
acceptable level of compliance” tends to be subjective because it depends on the 
nature of the treaty, the context and the exact behaviour of the parties involved. In 
order to attain a better understanding of the above, the final section of this chapter 
delves into the pertinent elements of the international counter-terrorism regime in order 
to determine the level of variance regarding compliance with the regime by the two 
countries under consideration in this study.  
 
3.10 The international counter-terrorism regime 
The previous chapters provided introductory comments on the genesis of the 
international counter-terrorism regime and the events and global actors that led to its 
development. This section expands upon this and provides some background to the 
global counter-terrorism architecture and its key legal statutes. Terrorism scholar, 




of new norms and rules pertaining to counter-terrorism and covering a plethora of 
transnational activities such as transport, aviation, finance, the maritime industry, 
immigration, law enforcement and cooperation amongst the judiviary and other 
measures to control and regulate nuclear weapons. Prior to 9/11, the global 
community of states developed counter-terrorism policies that were heavily influenced 
by domestic priorities (Romaniuk, 2010:592).  
Put differently, the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism cooperation proliferated only 
after the events of 9/11. Extending on this logic, Kramer and Yetif (2007:413) contend 
that “with a swiftness and decisiveness unprecedented in UN history, the Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 within 24 hours of the attacks which 
laid the foundation for the new, more assertive focus of the Security Council on 
international terrorism”. Furthermore, the authors argue that “the post September 11 
resolutions carry more significance and clout, frame the work of the UN organs on 
terrorism, and provide a framework and guide for action for most of the member states 
of the UN” (Kramer & Yetif, 2007:420). Based on the previous sections that discussed 
regimes, especially realism thought, it becomes evident that institutions and 
international cooperation are principally backed by great power interests and that 
smaller or weaker states in the international system are compelled to comply. As noted 
in this section, the UN Security Council spearheads the institutionalisation of counter-
terrorism. From this, the following section provides an overview of the various 
resolutions, bodies and organs tasked with global counter-terrorism cooperation and 
coordination. 
 
3.10.1 Response of UN Security Council to terrorism 
At the core of the Security Councils’ international counter-terrorism coordination efforts 
and institutionalisation of the counter-terrorism regime was the establishment of the 
CTC after the adoption of Resolution 1373 was passed on 28 September 2001 (three 
weeks after the 9/11 attacks). This resolution provided far-reaching and specific 
obligations for all member states to implement. Key amongst them was for member 




criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, 
of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds 
should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry 
out terrorists’ acts. (United Nations, 2001)  
In addition, Resolution 1373 prohibited states from providing support to entities or 
individuals involved in terrorist acts. To ensure commitment and progress by 
members, the CTC was mandated to submit a work programme to the Secretary 
General within 30 days for the purpose of support. Moreover, the Security Council 
drew in experts on a permanent basis with the formation of the Counter-Terrorism 
Executive Directorate (CTED) to support the activities of the CTC. According to 
Cortright, Lopez, Millar and Gerber-Stellingwerf (2007:24), the primary functions of the 
above-mentioned organisations are to strengthen the counter-terrorism capacity of UN 
member states, to provide them with the necessary technical assistance to carry out 
their UN-prescribed mandates and to “coordinate the counter-terrorism efforts of a 
wide range of international, regional, and sub-regional organizations within and 
beyond the UN system”. 
Despite this global coordinated attempt to counter terrorism, the CTC and the CTED 
are constantly confronted with a plethora of obstacles pertaining to compliance by 
member states. Key amongst these is the inability to develop an effective operational 
framework with a global outreach in order to determine whether member states are 
fulfilling their mandates entirely (Cortright et al., 2007:24). Another critical component 
is the inability of the Security Council to enforce compliance with the mandates of 
Resolution 1373. For instance, the CTC and CTED do not have an “agreed global 
criteria for evaluating implementation capacities or for deciding what additional steps 
a state should take to achieve compliance” (Cortright et al., 2007:30).  
Furthermore, the current legal instruments of the Security Council cannot impose 
punitive measures on states that are able but not willing to comply with key provisions 
of UN resolutions on combating terrorism. This may be attributed to the assumption 
that resolutions and the composition of the UN Security Council are dominated by 
superpowers that impose their will on the developing world by acting as ‘global 
legislators’.  




more than 600 reports received by the CTC provide a wealth of information about 
worldwide counter-terrorism capacity. The reports indicate that many states are 
taking steps to revise their laws and enhance their enforcement capacity for 
implementation of UN counter-terrorism mandates.  
Furthermore, there has been an increasing number of states partaking in the 13 UN 
counter-terrorism conventions, especially the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) (Cortright et al., 2007:28). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, not only did member states reach the consensus that a global 
response is required to combat terrorism but also, the adoption of the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy in September 2006 provided the impetus as a unique 
global instrument in the campaign against terrorism at national, regional and 
international levels (United Nations, 2006). Regarding the counter-terrorism efforts 
pursued by African states, the domestication of counter-terrorism legislation is heavily 
influenced by the CTC, not its continental body, the AU. The following section provides 
an overview of the legal instruments and structures that are in place to combat 
terrorism in Africa.  
 
3.11 An overview of the African counter-terrorism regime 
Since the focus of this study is on terrorism in Africa in general and Kenya and 
Tanzania in particular, an overview with reference to the key strategies, policies and 
legal framework is pivotal in understanding how the continent as a regional body has 
been waging the campaign against terrorism. As discussed earlier, the theories on 
regime formation denote a scenario in which an issue on the international stage is 
identified and diagnosed as a problem and states then collectively employ Krasner’s 
(1982:2) conceptualisation of regimes by developing “implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations”. The literature review chapter of 
this study pointed out the convergence of expectations towards the campaign against 
terrorism on the continent, more specifically, the role of the OAU Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999) and the Plan of Action of the African 




Africa Peace and Security Architecture is the continent’s non-military approach 
towards resolving violent conflicts that are prevalent in the region (Desmidt, 2019:79).  
It is evident that the continent’s legal architecture in the fight against terrorism has 
been tremendously influenced by the events of 9/11. It is important, however, not to 
overemphasise the dominance of the United States and the UN in compelling states 
to criminalise terrorist activities since some African states welcome the authority in 
order to fulfil their own political agendas such as supressing political opponents or 
critics or having a genuine concern regarding terrorists within their borders. The latter 
gives credence to Solomon (2015:105) who posits that the threat of terrorism is on the 
increase and that the significant number of 22 countries on the continent has been 
targeted by terrorism. By 2014, the transnational goals of terrorist organisations such 
as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab had already penetrated 
states such Benin, Cameroon and Mozambique that had previously never experienced 
terrorist activities.  
Before the adoption of Resolution 1373 of the UN in 2001, the OAU Convention on 
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999) had already made provision for 
member states to criminalise terrorist activity in order to counter the terrorist threat. 
However, it was only after 9/11, after pressure from the UN, that member states started 
enacting domestic legislation to criminalise terrorism and its associated activities. In 
other words, international pressure primarily driven by the United States saw a surge 
in African states complying with their international obligations. Core areas of the 
convention are that member states should: 
• “Review their national laws and establish criminal offences for terrorist acts as 
defined in this Convention and make such acts punishable by appropriate 
penalties that account for the grave nature of such offences; 
• Prevent their territories from being used as a base for the planning, organisation 
or execution of terrorist acts or for the participation or collaboration in these acts 
in any form whatsoever; and  
• Develop and strengthen methods of monitoring and detecting plans or activities 




and use of arms, ammunition and explosives and other materials and means of 
committing terrorist acts” (African Union, 1999:4-6). 
In line with the CTC/CTED of the UN Security Council, Sturman (2002:106) argues 
that although the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000 Article 23(2) makes 
provision for sanctions against a member state that fails to comply with its decisions 
and policies on counter-terrorism in practice, the AU has “no precedent and little power 
to enforce compliance”. 
To demonstrate its commitment to the scourge of terrorism and to cement the 
provisions of the above-mentioned declaration, the AU developed a Plan of Action of 
the African Union for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which was adopted 
in September 2002. Furthermore, this Plan of Action catered for a think tank / technical 
arm called the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) 
(Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2019). The primary objective of the ACSRT “is to 
contribute to and strengthen the capacity of the African Union through the PSC [Peace 
and Security Council] in the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa, with the 
ultimate objective of eliminating the threat posed by terrorism to peace, security, 
stability and development in Africa”. (ISS, 2019)  
It becomes evident that the counter-terrorism instruments of the UN and the AU are in 
harmony if one considers the technical assistance that is embedded in their attempts 
to provide capacity-building programmes for their members. Moreover, the Plan of 
Action mimics the core provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and 
amongst other counter-terrorism measures states: 
Eradicating terrorism requires a firm commitment by Member States to pursue 
common objectives. These include: exchange of information among Member 
States on the activities and movements of terrorist groups in Africa; mutual legal 
assistance; exchange of research and expertise; and the mobilization of 
technical assistance and cooperation, both within Africa and internationally, to 
upgrade the scientific, technical and operational capacity of Member States. 
(African Union, 2002:1) 
Despite these bold steps to combat terrorism, African states have been reluctant to 




Report developed to share information on lessons learnt and tactics on 
counter-terrorism on a secured network (Sturman, 2002:106). Additionally, Solomon 
(2015:114) contends that the problem with the African counter-terrorism framework 
lies in the behaviour of individual states. Furthermore, Solomon (2015:114) argues 
that African states “jealous refusal to share sovereignty with the continental body; its 
short-sighted and parochial view of national self-interest in the face of the transnational 
security threat posed by terrorism; its predatory behaviour towards citizens; and its 
growing criminalisation”.  
 
3.12 Concluding remarks 
This chapter provided the theoretical anchor and the key assumptions developed by 
the dominant strands of IR, namely liberal institutionalism and realism. The chapter 
began by providing an overview of the competing theories of regime formations as 
articulated by the above schools of thought. However, there is a clear ideological 
divide between the two, with liberal thought asserting that regimes are instrumental in 
addressing failures in world politics in a variety of issue areas, and the realist 
contending that the state is the pre-eminent actor in world politics. Nevertheless, both 
schools of thought consider regimes the product of rational self-interested actors. Of 
primary importance is the issue of compliance. The chapter provided a multiplicity of 
factors that may influence states to comply or not to comply with the norms of a regime. 
To address the problem statement and research questions of this study, the theoretical 
framework of this chapter is applied in Chapter 4 in order to explain the variance in 
compliance with the international counter-terrorism regime of the two case studies. 
The chapter concluded by providing an overview of global counter-terrorism 
cooperation and coordination, its architecture, challenges and the factors that led to 
its evolvement. 
What is evident from the literature, especially from a regime-theory perspective, is that 
the development of the counter-terrorism architecture was significantly influenced by 
the events of 9/11. Although terrorism and its proliferation is a genuine concern for 
states in the international system, the urgency to promulgate laws, policies and 
strategies was never a priority until the adoption of Resolution 1373 compelled 




its facets and manifestations. This gives credence to the realist school of thought that 
international institutions and agreements merely represent the distribution of power in 
the international system that is anarchic by nature and that hegemons exploit them for 
their own interests. However, according to liberal institutionalists, international 
institutions are pivotal in forging global peace and security and provide a platform to 
address global concerns such as the environment, poverty, the global arms trade, 
nuclear weapons, terrorism, which is of great significance to this study, and other 





CHAPTER 4: TERRORISM AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
COUNTER-TERRORISM REGIME IN KENYA AND TANZANIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the conceptual framing of the international 
counter-terrorism regime by delving into and dissecting the major IR theories of 
realism and liberalism. Most importantly, Chapter 3 served as the theoretical anchor 
and is applied in this chapter in order to answer the research questions and address 
the problem statement of this study. The main research question that the study aimed 
to answer is: How do political factors explain the degree of variance in compliance with 
the international counter-terrorism regime by Kenya and Tanzania? The latter guides 
and is the crux of this chapter. In addition, although it is not the main focus of this 
study, this chapter provides a brief overview of the terrorism landscape of Kenya and 
Tanzania and attempts to explain their respective level of compliance with the 
international counter-terrorism regime by critically unpacking the factors that influence 
the degree and nature of compliance. More specifically, the central tenets of regime 
theory have been applied as an analytical tool to assess the various counter-terrorism 
laws, policies, programmes and present the patterns and depth of cooperation with 
regional and international institutions by Kenya and Tanzania in the fight against 
terrorism.  
 
4.2 Terrorism in Kenya: The geographical curse 
As mentioned in previous chapters, after the Embassy bombings of 1998, Kenya 
suffered another terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda operatives in November 2002, a bomb 
attack in its coastal town of Mombasa that killed 15 people (Muhala, 2007:43). In the 
following year, security forces were alerted to another imminent threat targeting 
Western interests, which led to major airlines cancelling flights to Kenya for many 
weeks. The authorities in Kenya responded by suspending aviation activities from the 
source (Somalia) of its problems pertaining to terrorism. (Muhala, 2007:43). More than 
a decade later, Kenya continues to be the victim of the fanatical ideologues of local 




its assault on Kenyan territory. The terrorist organisation killed 67 people in an 
upmarket shopping mall (Westgate Shopping Mall) in the nation’s capital in September 
2013. The attack lasted for four days as the terrorists battled with Kenyan security 
forces (Cat & Graham, 2014). As the threat from the group intensified, another deadly 
attack was launched by the group on 3 April 2015. Four gunmen entered Garissa 
University College and killed 148 people who they singled out as Christians. This was 
the second-deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya (BBC News, 2019). In January 2019, 
the Al-Shabaab terrorist group struck again as five gunmen stormed an office complex 
and hotel in Nairobi killing 21 people. Before the attack, the terrorists set off car bombs 
and suicide explosions outside the complex (Osman, 2019). Importantly, Kenya is a 
target due to its leading military role in 2007 under the auspices of the UN Security 
Council’s sanctioned AU peacekeeping force in Somalia, known as the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Felter et al., 2020) and its US-backed efforts to 
dismantle the group military in Somalia (Ward, 2019:1). Muhula (2007:49) contends 
that the primary reason why Kenya became target is primarily because of the collapse 
of the state apparatus and the subsequent disillusionment of radical Muslims. As 
Scharrer (2018) posits, the marginalisation of Kenyan-Somalis generated anger 
amongst Al-Shabaab functionaries, leading to attacks on Kenya because of 
disgruntlement. The geographical proximity of Kenya to Somalia coupled with an 
insecure border and ungoverned spaces in the periphery provide Al-Shabaab the 
impetus to launch terrorist attacks in Kenya. 
Similarly, Aronson (2013:26) argues that the proximity of Kenya to weak states such 
as Sudan has “created a safe haven for transnational terrorist groups”. Furthermore, 
Kenya has a significant Muslim population of approximately 300 000 “who mainly live 
along the coast that borders Tanzania and Somalia” (Muhala, 2007:47). Moreover, 
since local Muslims share a common ancestry with states in the Arab-Peninsula, it 
made it more convenient for radicals with extreme views to co-exist with the local 
community, start families and conduct their terrorist activities (operating cells) (Muhala, 
2007:47). According to the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2017:  
“Many African states are battlegrounds for violent extremism and jihadist 
terrorists. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates operate on the continent and have 
increased the lethality of their attacks, expanded into new areas, and targeted 




terror attack by Islamic fundamentalists, the U.S. has vested interest to ensure 
that there is no safe haven for terrorist organisations to train, recruit and use East 
Africa as a launching pad to attack its interests in the region and its homeland”. 
(Trump, 2017:52)  
Kenya continues with counter-terrorism measures to stave off the onslaught from 
internal and external security threats and has cooperated to a significant degree with 
regional and international bodies and states in certain counter-terrorism issue areas.  
 
4.3 Major extremist and terrorist Incidents 
Apart from the 1998 Nairobi U.S. Embassy bombing, the Garrisa University attack, the 
Westgate Shopping Mall siege and the Dusit Hotel attack, Kenya’s historiography of 
terrorism continues unabated. The table below from the Counter Extremism Project 
(2020) bears testimony to the frequency of terrorist incidents within Kenyan territory 
and is, therefore, worth reproducing in full.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of major extremist and terrorist events in Kenya 
Date Description of Terrorist/Extremist Incident 
January 7, 2020  “Al-Shabab militants open fire near Saretho village in Garissa 
county near the border with Somalia. The attackers kill four 
children and wound three others before security forces repel 
the assailants. The extremists were targeting a 
telecommunications mast”. 
January 5, 2020 “Al-Shabab militants attack the shared U.S.-Kenyan Manda 
Bay Airfield near Kenya’s border with Somalia. The attack kills 
one U.S. Service member and two U.S. military contractors. 
Two other contractors are also wounded. The attack is the 
first against U.S. forces inside Kenya”. 
December 6, 2019 “Suspected al-Shabab militants attack a bus in Kotulo, Kenya 
near the border with Somalia. The attack kills at least 10”. 
October 12, 2019 “A Kenyan police vehicle strikes a homemade bomb near the 
border with Somalia. At least ten police officers are killed. Al-
Shabab is suspected to have planted the bomb”. 
June 15, 2019 A roadside bomb hits a police vehicle near Kenya’s border 
with Somalia. The blast kills at least 11 officers who were in 




Islamic insurgents the previous day. Al-Shabab claims 
responsibility for the attack. 
April 13, 2019 “Two Cuban doctors working for the Kenyan government are 
kidnapped by gunmen reportedly affiliated with al-Shabab. 
One police officer is shot and killed during the abduction. It is 
suspected that the gunmen took the doctors to Somalia”. 
July 5, 2017 Al-Shabab militants, using rocket-propelled grenades and 
gunfire, kill three Kenyan policemen in a raid on a police 
station in the north-eastern Kenyan town of Pandanguo. The 
raid follows a series of al-Shabab attacks in Kenya that killed 
at least 28 people in the previous six weeks, most along the 
border with Somalia. 
May 24, 2017 Nine Kenyan police officers are killed in two separate 
roadside bombings in Eastern Kenya. Al-Shabab claims 
responsibility for both attacks. A day earlier, Kenyan police 
said they were “on alert” for an increase in violence after al-
Shabab fighters was detected moving into Kenya in small 
groups.  
November 26, 2016 Kenyan police say they have thwarted a terror attack in 
Garissa County after discovering a large cache of weapons 
and ammunition, including improvised explosive devices and 
a suicide vest. The cache is believed to have belonged to al-
Shabab militants who snuck into the country across the 
border with Somalia. 
December 2011 Kenyan police arrest British national Jermaine Grant, his 
Kenyan wife, and an accomplice for planning to attack British, 
French and American targets. 
Samantha Lewthwaite, the widow of July 7, 2005, London 
bomber Germaine Lindsay, had also been part of the cell and 
reportedly escaped minutes before police arrived. Police 
found bomb materials in Grant’s Mombasa apartment where 
he was arrested. Grant and his accomplices reportedly 
planned to blow up Western hotels along Kenya’s coast 
during Christmas. Investigators connected the cell to al-
Shabaab”. 
Source: Counter Extremism Project (2020, 3-8) 
 
From the above, it is clear that Kenya continues with counter-terrorism measures to 
stave off the onslaught from internal and external security threats and has cooperated 
to a significant degree with regional and international bodies and states in certain 




major shortcomings by various state institutions in their handling of terrorism-related 
cases. These and the inertia by some organs of the state in dealing with the threat of 
terrorism are discussed. The following section provides a brief overview of the 
terrorism landscape of Tanzania and concludes with a similar table highlighting the 
major terrorist- and extremist-related incidents. 
 
4.4 Terrorism in Tanzania: The threat of domestic Islamic militancy 
It is important to note that Tanzania’s experience with significant terrorist attacks is 
limited to the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam. The existing 
literature on the study of terrorism pertaining to Tanzania denotes a scenario of a state 
battling primarily with internal conflicts emanating from or immersed in religious and 
socio-economic dynamics. Nonetheless, the country has not escaped the wrath of 
Islamic extremism shaped and influenced by terror activities occurring in its region. Its 
geographical proximity to conflict-ridden states such as Somalia and a significant 
Muslim population has been exploited by local religious leaders who incite violence 
against other faiths. Relatedly, the report, Tanzania: Extremism and Counter-
Extremism of 2018 by the Counter Extremism Project asserts:  
“Since 2009, Tanzania has experienced low-level sporadic extremist violence in 
the form of arson, acid-attacks, shootings, beheadings, and bombings. 
Tanzanian authorities rarely investigate these attacks fully, leading to an 
intelligence gap with regard to the identity, affiliation, goal, and ideology of the 
perpetrators”. (Counter Extremism Project [CEP], 2018:5)  
Despite the absence of organised terror attacks in Tanzania, militants from Kenya and 
Tanzania have been linked to the rising insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province of 
Mozambique (Mukeredzi, 2020). This exportation of terrorism poses a serious threat 
to states within the Southern African region. 
The genesis of these domestic extremism acts is fuelled by the systematic 
discrimination against Muslims by Christians that has persisted since the colonial era 
(CEP, 2018:1). In addition, the report succinctly states that “Tanzania’s Islamic 
extremist landscape is a blurred mix between domestic networks incensed by local 




(CEP, 2018:2). The ambitions of terrorist organisations are to establish an Islamic 
fundamentalist state in the Horn of Africa and in countries where they have a presence. 
Complementary to this is the assertion of LeSage (2014:9) that while the threat from 
local Islamists is real, the lethal threat is posed when they partner up with like-minded 
groups that operate on a global level. Another significant aspect as to why Tanzania 
has not suffered a full terror attack by Al-Shabaab is that it does not share a direct 
border with Somalia and only has a moderate Somali population. In addition, it is not 
part of AMISOM comprising Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda that battle 
against Al-Shabaab militants (Dang, 2019:3).  
Moreover, the report notes that Tanzania is considered as a safe haven, logistical hub 
and launching pad for extremists joining Al-Shabaab in Kenya and the broader region, 
and it was at Dar es Salaam international airport where the infamous Islamic State 
executioner ‘Jihadi John’ was arrested while on his way to Somalia from the 
Netherlands (CEP, 2018:5). The broader security implications for Tanzania is a 
concoction of its domestic Islamic extremist elements and “at the extreme … it could 
emerge as part of a wider, regional safe haven for militants linked to al Shabab” 
(LeSage, 2014:5). 
 
4.5 Major extremist and terrorist incidents 
Unlike Kenya, “the attacks in Tanzania have been relatively unsophisticated. They 
have involved crude homemade explosives, handguns, and buckets of acid; they have 
been focused on poorly protected targets of opportunity; and they have not resulted in 
mass casualties” (LeSage, 2014:1). Today, the threat persists from domestic Islamic 
extremists who may team up with regional or international terrorist organisations to 
launch sophisticated attacks and inflict damage that is even greater than the Dar es 
Salaam U.S. Embassy bombing. Below is a redacted version of Tanzania’s experience 
with terrorism-related activities presented by the Counter Extremism Project. For 
purposes of comparison in tracing the frequency of terrorist attacks, a table similar to 





Table 4.2: Summary of major extremist and terrorist events in Tanzania 
Date Description of Terrorist/Extremist Incident 
April 13, 2017 “Gunmen ambush a police vehicle in Kibiti, Pwani Region, 
shooting dead eight officers and stealing their weaponry. 
Police pursue the assailants back to their hideout, killing 
four of them—though other assailants escape into a nearby 
forest. According to Police Commissioner Nsato Mssanzya, 
the incident ‘does not in any way relate to terrorism,’ and is 
instead ‘criminal activity which was carried out by a group 
of bandits.’ The incident follows a string of small-scale 
killings in Kibiti. In August 2017, Tanzanian security officers 
apprehend and shoot dead 13 individuals allegedly tied to 
the April Kibiti killings. 
May 30, 2016 Unidentified assailants wielding machetes behead eight 
people after invading three homes in Mzizima Ward, Tanga 
Region. According to media sources, the assailants had 
been living in the Amboni Caves in Tanga and had carried 
out the killings fearing that the victims would reveal 
information to authorities about accomplices in the group. 
Tanzanian news outlets refer to the assailants as ‘thugs’ 
and ‘bandits.’ On June 27, 2016, police in Dar es Salaam 
shoot dead a suspected accomplice in the incident, and that 
city’s Special Police Zone Commander Simon Sirro says his 
security forces are making progress against ‘terrorism.’ 
May 19, 2016 Fifteen masked perpetrators wage an attack with IEDs, 
machetes, and axes at the Masjid Rahmani mosque in the 
northwest region of Mwanza—hacking to death three 
people, including the mosque’s imam. According to 
eyewitnesses, the assailants, carrying black flags, begin the 
attack by turning off the lights and asking worshippers: ‘Why 
are you praying while our fellow Muslims are unfairly held 
by the police?’ Police describe the incident as a ‘terrorist-
style attack’ and arrest at least three suspects. No group 
claims responsibility. 
February 14, 2015 Security forces conduct a raid on suspected al-Shabab 
militants hiding in the Amboni Caves in Tanga City, weeks 
after those operatives are believed to have robbed police of 
two machine guns. The raid results in the death of one 
Tanzania Peoples’ Defense Forces (TPDF) soldier and the 
wounding of five others. The suspects are able to flee, 
leading police commissioner Paul Changoja to concede that 




Shabab—though he says that they are ‘more than bandits.’ 
Following the raid, al-Shabab releases an 11-minute video 
online, during which a man calling himself Kaisy bin 
Abdullah claims responsibility for the killing of the soldier 
and warns of attacks on prisons where inmates are 
‘inappropriately jailed.’ 
September 6, 2014 Suspected Islamist assailants storm a police station in 
Bukombe District, Geita Region, killing two policemen and 
injuring two others. Police arrest the perpetrators and, 
according to the U.S. Department of State, claim that they 
are Islamists seeking to steal weaponry to use in attacks 
against Christians. Tanzanian news sources, however, 
refer to the assailants as ‘armed gangsters’ and ‘robbers.’ 
October 2013 On October 7, Tanzanian police arrest 11 al-Shabab 
suspects on Mt. Makolionga in Tanzania’s southeast region 
of Mtwara. During the arrest police seize firearms, 
machetes, and 25 DVDs containing al-Shabab training 
materials.  
According to authorities, the suspects—all Tanzanian 
nationals—had engaged in ‘intensive’ military training 
exercises. On October 18, Mtwara police arrest two other 
al-Shabab suspects, allegedly tied to the previous group of 
11. During the same month, Kenyan military forces arrest 
three Tanzanians in Somalia as they attempt to travel to an 
al-Shabab training camp there. 
February 11, 2013 Suspected Islamists behead a priest, Mathayo Kachila, in 
the northwest region of Mwanza amid interfaith rioting 
related to Christian butchery practices. A group of 
Christians had reportedly arranged for a non-Muslim 
butcher to prepare meat for a Christian funeral reception, 
setting off the violence. Muslims generally oversee all 
butchery practices in Tanzania, as Muslims only eat meat 
that has been ritually slaughtered, and Christians have no 
such restraints. 
October 12, 2012–
October 18, 2012 
Suspected Islamists wage arson attacks on numerous 
churches throughout Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania—
including five in Dar es Salaam alone. 
The attacks are reported to stem from inflammatory 
comments made by Islamic leaders including Sheikh Ponda 
Issa Ponda against Christians, following an October 10, 
2012, incident in Dar es Salaam in which a 14-year-old 
Christian schoolboy urinated on the Quran of his Muslim 




community that a Christian leader had instructed the boy to 
defile the Muslim holy book. Authorities arrest at least 126 
people in the wake of the church attack 
June 2012 Tanzanian authorities at the Dar es Salaam airport arrest 
German national of Turkish origin Emrah Erdogan, alleging 
that in early May, Erdogan crossed into Kenya from Somalia 
where he had been fighting with al-Shabab. Authorities 
suspect that Erdogan was complicit in an al-Shabab 
bombing at a Nairobi shopping center just before flying to 
Tanzania. 
November 2011 Tanzanian police arrest 10 Tanzanian nationals with 
suspected links to al-Shabab on the Tanzanian-Kenyan 
border. According to authorities, the suspects had been 
planning to join al-Shabab in Somalia”. 
Source: Counter Extremism Project (2018:6-9) 
 
The foregoing sections offered background regarding the terrorism landscape of the 
countries under study and the following sections unpack their various 
counter-terrorism measures and level of cooperation with the international 
counter-terrorism regime spearheaded by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, and 
most importantly, the sections attempt to analyse and explain the level of cooperation 
with various actors in the counter-terrorism regime and explain the degree of 
compliance or the lack thereof. 
 
4.6 Kenya: Counter-terrorism law, institutions and practice 
4.6.1 Counter-terrorism legislation 
Regarding the legal instruments to combat terrorism, Kenya only enacted its first 
counter-terrorism law dubbed the ‘Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003’ five years after 
the 1998 Nairobi U.S. Embassy bombing. However, this piece of legislation faced 
heavy criticism from across Kenya’s social, religious and political spectrum after being 
labelled as an infringement on international human rights, goes against the 
fundamental principles of the supreme law, detrimental towards national unity and 
cohesion, and a product of western states (Mogire & Mkutu Agade, 2011:477). The 




later, the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2006 was created, which suffered the same fate as the 
previous bill (Mogire & Mkutu Agade, 2011:477). Kenyan politicians perceived the law 
as imposed by the United States and hence not a priority for Kenya. Furthermore, and 
Members of Parliament then lamented that they would only support the bill if the United 
States compensated the victims of the 1998 terror attack, which the United States 
refused to do (Mogire & Mkutu Agade, 2011:277). Despite these legal and political 
challenges, the country finally promulgated and implemented the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 2012 (amended 2014) and enacted a new constitution in 2010, which 
laid the foundation for Kenya’s overarching counter-terrorism legal framework (Bailey, 
2019:137). The new Constitution promotes civil liberties, a “strengthened judiciary and 
by passing a range of new statutes, provides a strong set of counterterrorism tools” 
(Bailey, 2019:137). However, despite the enactment of legal frameworks to protect 
human rights, Kenyan security forces have been confronted with fierce opposition for 
violating the fundamental freedoms of citizens suspected of involvement in terrorist 
activities, as illustrated in the following section. 
 
4.6.2 Counter-terrorism practice 
The main objective of Kenya’s counter-terrorism strategy is to create stability in East 
Africa (Somalia) and prevent terrorist attacks in its homeland, but the security threat 
from Al-Shabaab persists, as previous sections demonstrate. In attempting to thwart 
attacks from this terrorist group, the country’s security apparatus has constantly been 
accused of violating the Constitution by denying due process to terrorist suspects. The 
World Report 2015 of the Human Rights Watch (HRW) provided a damning account 
of Kenya’s counter-terrorism measures by asserting that “Kenya’s efforts to tackle a 
wide array of security threats have been marred by ongoing patterns of serious human 
rights violations by Kenyan security forces, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary 
detentions, and torture” (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2015:331). The overreach by 
government forces during one of their counter-terrorism operations in 2014 that 
targeted ethnic Somali and Muslim communities resulted in gross human rights 
violations and other civil liberties that the 2010 Constitution meant to protect and 




[D]uring Operation Usalama Watch in Nairobi and Mombasa in April 2014, 
security forces from multiple agencies raided homes, buildings, and shops, 
carting away money, cell phones and other goods. They harassed and detained 
thousands-including journalists, refugees, Kenyan citizens and international aid 
workers-without charge, and in appalling conditions for periods well beyond the 
24-hour legal limit. (HRW, 2015:331)  
The HRW’s latest report of 2020 narrates with concern the enforced disappearances 
of citizens by security forces coupled with a lack of accountability and utter impunity 
despite promises by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta to hold them to account (HRW, 
2020:330). The above challenges towards combating terrorism have been 
exacerbated by the corruption of state officials, the absence of security forces in 
remote areas, a significant refugee population and the circulation of illegally owned 
small firearms (Bailey, 2019:134). With reference to the judicial process of prosecuting 
suspected terrorists, the existing literature and media sources narrate a high acquittal 
rate as Kenyan authorities blithely ignore the legal process from the arraignment of 
terror suspects through the judicial process to trial. The remarks made by the High 
Court during the trial of alleged Al-Shabaab suspects are considered: 
I wish to point out that the investigations, if any, were poorly done. I am aware it 
was at a time, and this continues to date, when this Republic was facing anxiety 
due to insecurity due to terrorism. The Police and all security agencies must play 
their part and do it well. The Judiciary must also do their part. However, the 
anxiety, fear or suspicion alone cannot be used as a basis of conviction where 
evidence is lacking. (Bailey, 2019:106) 
Judicial setbacks such as the above pose serious setbacks to the country’s counter-
terrorism efforts if state institutions lack the capacity to investigate and do not 
cooperate on an inter-agency level to detect, disrupt and successfully prosecute 
terrorists. It inevitably provides impetus to terrorists’ ambitions and emboldens their 
propaganda machinery to cause further destruction and insecurity. The legal 
framework, no matter how robust, will be futile if it fails to achieve what it was meant 
to accomplish as a consequence of inertia and incompetence emanating from state 
agencies at the forefront of the ‘war on terror’. Responses should always be lawful, 





4.6.3 Counter-terrorism institutions 
The ability of the Kenyan government to respond effectively to the threat posed by 
terrorism relies on joint efforts from various agencies within the security cluster to 
collaborate and share information about imminent threats and the envisaged 
coordinated response. As the previous sections have illustrated, the link between 
counter-terrorism law and practice is to a large degree dependent on the effectiveness 
of state institutions that are at the frontline of countering the deadly threat presented 
by terrorism. In the case of Kenya, the establishment of various bodies and other 
common security agencies derive their legitimacy from the Prevention of Terrorism 
Activities Act. However, Mogire and Mkutu Agade (2011:476) proffer that the crux of 
Kenya’s counter-terrorism strategy has been spearheaded by the United States with 
an emphasis on “institutional development in order to improve government counter-
terrorist capacity”.  
Perhaps more pointedly is the proliferation of counter-terrorism initiatives 
spearheaded by the United States after the 1998 terror attacks that culminated in the 
establishment of institutions such as the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) 
and the “designation by the US government of Kenya as ‘an anchor state’ in the Horn 
of Africa and a ‘frontline’ in the ‘Global War on Terror’ GWOT” (Mogire & Mkutu Agade, 
2011:475). The Country Report on Terrorism (UCRT) 2018 released in October 2019 
by the State Department of the U.S. asserts that Kenya’s counter-terrorism structures 
consist of three branches: 
1) “The National Police Service – the Kenya Police Service (including the 
paramilitary General Service Unit, Traffic Police, and countrywide regional, 
county and local police stations);  
2) The Directorate of Criminal Investigations (including the investigative 
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the Bomb Disposal Unit and the Cyber Forensics 
Investigative Unit); and 
3) Administration Police (including the Border Police Unit)”  
Notwithstanding the above institutionalisation of counter-terrorism measures 




continent has benefitted more from counter-terrorism support, training and resources 
than Kenya. As Section 4.8 illustrates, Kenya remains the cradle of American attempts 
and actions to contain the threat of terrorism within the Horn of Africa because the 
country remains a sanctuary for terrorist and radical movements that threaten 
American interests and its allies in the region. Nonetheless, one cannot discount 
similar counter-terrorism initiatives in the region, especially in a country such as 
Tanzania that has experienced terrorist activities. This is a focus of the current 
research in order to achieve the objectives of the study.  
 
4.7 Tanzania: Counter-terrorism law, practice and institutions 
4.7.1 Counter-terrorism legislation 
Unlike Kenya, Tanzania’s counter-terrorism legislation setting out the nation’s legal 
framework against terrorism was passed in 2002 (The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
2002) with minimum debate owing to internal political dynamics. As with most 
counter-terrorism legislations, the Act defines a terrorist act as an act with the intention 
to: 
• “Seriously intimidate a population; 
• Unduly compel a government or perform or abstain from performing any act; 
• Seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation; and 
• Otherwise influence such government or international organisation” (United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2002:7). 
The Act further defines an act of terrorism as “(1) attacks upon a person's life that may 
cause death; (2) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; and (3) kidnapping of 
a person” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002:7). 
It is important to note that the above legislation is not the only legal instrument that 
criminalises terrorist activities. In fact, within the context of counter-terrorism 
legislation, the country’s 1981 Penal Code (applicable only to the mainland) 




seditions and armed public riots (Bailey, 2019:240). Furthermore, these two legal 
instruments are complemented by the 2006 Anti-Money Laundering Act (United 
Republic of Tanzania, 2006) that criminalises illicit financial flows, money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism. In addition, the Act makes provision for the 
establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit that legally compels financial institutions 
to report suspicious financial transactions and to set up various risk mitigating 
measures that will prevent individuals and groups from compromising the integrity of 
the country’s financial system (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006). 
 
4.7.2 Counter-terrorism practice 
Despite the absence of mass casualties inflicted through terrorism, the nation’s 
security forces, as in the case of Kenya, have come under heavy criticism for the way 
they have dealt with terror suspects. Dang (2019:1) asserts that “local communities 
are concerned about the securitized response to violent extremism and the 
involvement of police and security forces in extrajudicial disappearances and 
executions of violence extremism suspects.” Complementary to this, the UCRT of 
2018 (2019:46) narrates how security forces exercised brutality and transgressed the 
nation’s laws by denying terror suspects due process.  
As the previous sections have shown, the rising extremist violence emanating from 
local extremist groups, have been downplayed by the Tanzanian government and 
security forces as acts carried out by “criminal bandits” (Dang, 2019:7) and, therefore, 
not terrorism related. According to the UCRT (2019:46), the reluctance to register 
these attacks as terrorism perhaps explains why Tanzania reported no terrorist 
incidents in 2018. This is compounded by a shortage of literature on the effectiveness 
of the counter-terrorism framework in terms of the number of successful prosecutions 
of terrorism-related offences. Despite these shortcomings, the report noted that “in 
October 2018, Tanzanian authorities announced the arrest of more than 120 
Tanzanian nationals in southern Tanzania for alleged involvement with terrorist 
organizations in Mozambique” (UCRT, 2019:46). This transnational cooperation on 
counter-terrorism efforts demonstrates the country’s willingness to provide a hostile 




institutions tasked with combating terrorism and how they have been able to respond 
to the terrorism threat. 
 
4.7.3 Counter-terrorism institutions 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 overwhelming provides the Tanzanian Police 
Force the operational mandate to be at the forefront of countering terrorism. In 
addition, in 2005, the government established the National Counter-Terrorism Centre 
(NCTC) within the Ministry of Home Affairs for a coordinated and cooperative 
relationship between intelligence, police, correctional services and immigration (Dang, 
2019:5). The overarching objective of the NCTC hinges on forging formidable 
partnerships locally and internationally to prevent rather than respond to terrorism,” 
and it is the focal point for the government’s engagement with the international 
community on countering violent extremism efforts” (Dang, 2019:5). Outside official 
security structures, the government has embarked on community policing initiatives to 
combat violent extremism and at the same time ease community tensions and various 
crimes (Kessels, Durner & Schwartz, 2016:49-50). However, there are concerns that 
this approach is primarily focused on intelligence gathering and may be exploited by 
community members providing “false information to target personal opponents rather 
than legitimate suspects” (Dang, 2019:17).  
The above illustrates the complexity and unintended consequences of 
counter-terrorism efforts not only in Tanzania but also in Kenya and other states that 
have embarked upon counter-terrorism measures. As the sections of this study on 
Kenya and Tanzania have shown, the attempts to detect, disrupt and successfully 
prosecute terror suspects have been overshadowed by the erosion of civil liberties by 
security forces, which has negatively affected the notion of democratic governance, 
even in the United States. The U.S. Patriot Act has undergone various iterations in 
areas that provide the security cluster with sweeping and unfettered powers to 
encroach upon civil liberties. Nonetheless, international pressure to comply with the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and other supplementary resolutions continues 
unabated. As the ‘global legislator’, the UN’s role has predominantly been focused on 
the soft aspects (technical skills to draft laws and capacity-building initiatives) of 




forces, the investigation of terrorism-related crimes, etc.) have been formed on a 
bilateral basis with strong states.  
 
4.8 Compliance with the counter-terrorism regime: A comparative analysis 
of Kenya and Tanzania  
The aim of this study was to explain how specific political factors affect the degree of 
compliance with the international counter-terrorism regime by Kenya and Tanzania 
and to present the nature of the terrorism threat faced by these two countries as the 
background. The study attempts to achieve the above objectives by critically analysing 
the key theoretical issues that pertain to compliance with international obligations 
through exploring the IR theories from a regime-theory perspective of realism and 
liberal institutionalism. In addition, the 2010 journal article by Beth Whitaker titled, 
‘Compliance among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime’ was 
employed as the theoretical framework.  
There is a dearth of studies in the regime literature that specifically delve into the 
relationship between regime formation and compliance with the international 
counter-terrorism regime. As the literature demonstrates, the phenomenon of 
counter-terrorism is primarily determined by states’ compliance with the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373 that requires them to domesticate specific counter-terrorism 
legislation in addition to the cooperation and collaboration of weaker states with global 
hegemons such as the United States through bilateral counter-terrorism initiatives. 
Furthermore, this regime formation was precipitated by the specific interests of states 
in the international system according to the dictum of the theory of hegemonic stability 
discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, the analysis section of this study focuses on the specific 
theoretical factors pertaining to compliance and non-compliance as narrated in 
Chapter 3 and the dominant IR theory that led to the formation and maintenance of 
the international counter-terrorism regime.  
Considering the above, Chapter 5 evaluates whether the main research questions and 
sub-questions have been answered according to the aims and objectives set out in 






4.9 Development of the international counter-terrorism regime: Has realism 
been vindicated or has liberal institutionalism prevailed? 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the UN is at the epicentre of the global counter-terrorism 
regime through bodies and institutions established by its Security Council. 
Nonetheless, scholarly evidence suggests that this attempt at institutionalising the 
global counter-terrorism response is marred by overlapping bodies and bureaucratic 
red tape that significantly hamper the mandate of the Security Council. Similarly, 
Cortright et al. (2007:42) argue that because of its political nature, the UN is incapable 
of executing the majority of the technical aspects of the resolutions it adopts. As can 
be seen in Figure 4.1, the hierarchical structure of the UN-led approach to 
counter-terrorism is convoluted with a number of bodies and institutions tasked with 
combating terrorism around the globe. There is currently more than 20 different 
institutions within the UN structure that addresses terrorism, with bodies such as the 
CTC and the CTED under the Security Council at the centre of this institutionalisation 
effort (Cortright et al., 2007:406-407).  
 
Figure 4.1: The international counter-terrorism regime 







UNITED STATES 'Global 
Enforcer' Acts On A Bilateral 
And Multilateral Level
SMALL AND WEAK 
STATES
The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and 
Crime (1997)












Current literature on the formation of the global counter-terrorism regime abounds with 
examples of how the United States used its power in the international system to 
advance its own national interests when it launched the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ after 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Invoking military solutions as a response to 
the terrorist attack suggests that the United States used one of the fundamental 
precepts that underpins realists’ thinking – might makes right. The basic premise of 
realism theory that states only cooperate when it is in their interests and the perception 
that institutions are a mere reflection of the distribution of power in the international 
system has been upheld by the way the international counter-terrorism regime 
architecture has been formed, reconfigured and maintained by powerful states on the 
global stage. The passing of Resolution 1368 only 24 hours after the 9/11 attacks and 
the subsequent passing of Resolution 1373 illustrates the pressure exerted by the 
United States. As former president, George W Bush, asserted, “[E]ither you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists”. The above resolutions, evidently driven, sponsored 
and articulated by the United States and solely representing the interests of America, 
led to the establishment of the global counter-terrorism regime and its accompanying 
bilateral engagements with various states around the globe on hard-core aspects of 
counter-terrorism such as law enforcement, intelligence sharing, joint military 
operations and border control.  
Hence, the formation of the international counter-terrorism regime demonstrates that 
states act according to their interests in the international system, and the decisions 
and outcomes emanating from these international institutions are a reflection of the 
power dynamics on the global stage. Contrary to the liberal institutionalist view that 
international institutions are a panacea for global peace and security, the hard-core 
aspects of combating terrorism is executed by individual powerful states that engage 
in bilateral counter-terrorism measures with weaker states, essentially necessitating 
these weak states to become involved with them. As the following sections 
demonstrate, regime enforcement is made possible by the United States but only in 
states where their national security is at risk. This may explain why, as alluded to in 
the previous chapter, the UN’s role in counter-terrorism is limited to the formulation of 
specific counter-terrorism laws by member states without the ability to enforce 




entitled to create norms, their ‘masters’-the states of which they are compromised -
identify and define the areas where the organisations may establish norms and the 
nature of the regulation”.  
It is this type of norm diffusion that gives credence to the realist assumptions that 
states are the most important unit of analysis and are the pre-eminent actors in the 
international system. Despite these fundamental divergences with liberal 
institutionalism in the realm of international security, the application of its key 
assumptions and relevance to the counter-terrorism regime is pertinent in certain 
respects. As Tankel (2018) observes, states affected by terrorism willingly cooperate 
with the United States for shared priorities and are “aware of how they can benefit 
from the unique, high-end capabilities that the United States can provide”. However, 
regardless of these common interests, Pokalova (2015:491) argues:  
States that joined the War on Terror have done that under the leadership of the 
United States, thus indicating, even if indirectly, that the U.S. as a great power 
exerted some level of leverage on the international arena in counterterrorist 
efforts.  
Augmenting this argument is the fact that the United States continues to play a 
dominating role in the institutionalisation and cooperation of all member states of the 
UN in complying with international counter-terrorism legal instruments and efforts. As 
Cortright et al. (2007:36) argue, the United States and its Western allies have always 
been against the establishment of a multilateral capacity-building trust fund, with the 
United States asserting that bilateral counter-terrorism initiatives are sufficient to 
address the global need.  
The obvious implication of this argument is that the UN-led counter-terrorism efforts 
do not have the capacity to manage this global counter-terrorism security cooperation 
and coordination and hence, the bilateral intervention by powerful states such as the 
United States. This is not surprising given that the CTC lacks the political authority and 
the necessary resources such as finances to implement fully the key provisions of 
Resolution 1373 (Cortright et al., 2007:27). For these reasons, it is possible to argue 
that this is preferable for the United States in order to ensure that it can enforce 
compliance directly and assist only states in which its national interests are at risk. The 




regime and the dominant IR theory that led to its development is provided by Romaniuk 
(2010:613) who asserts the following:  
Liberals would expect that institutions offer opportunities for mutual benefits and 
absolute gains from cooperation. But the facts here do not reflect such liberal 
assumptions. If counter-terrorism cooperation were driven by consensus, the 
pattern of influence and resistance would be less stark and, for example, efforts 
to rationalize the UN's role would proceed with less conflict.  
Overall, the events of 9/11 provided the impetus for a more structured and coordinated 
approach to a global counter-terrorism campaign, with smaller states having little or 
no choice in being involved with the international effort against terrorism.  
To conclude this section, it is pertinent to note that the institutionalisation of 
counter-terrorism through the UN provided the political cover for states that were 
susceptible to an ‘imposed regime’ or were perceived as pro-American and afforded 
the support that the United States needed to combat terrorism on an international 
forum (Kramer & Yetiv, 2007:431). Understanding why states cooperate and 
collaborate in the international system is fundamental in the study of IR. It can be 
gleaned from the above analysis that the global counter-terrorism architecture 
developed after 9/11 came about because of the domestic security situation in the 
United States, which ultimately led to global ramifications in security governance. As 
stated previously, issues pertaining to compliance and regime maintenance cannot be 
analysed without the involvement of the dominant actor or hegemon in the regime 
(United States). Hence, the subsequent sections provide an analysis in the varying 
levels of compliance with the international counter-terrorism regime by Kenya and 
Tanzania.  
 
4.10 Factors explaining the degree of compliance 
Accounting for the above theoretical and empirical conditions for the formation of the 
counter-terrorism regime and with reference to the theoretical framework discussed in 
Chapter 3, the following sections delve into the specific factors that attempt to explain 





4.10.1 Interests and the perceived threat of terrorism 
As mentioned previously, the geographical proximity of Kenya to states such as 
Somalia and Sudan coupled with domestic issues such as a porous border and a 
police force riddled with corruption provided the impetus for the country to be a victim 
of terrorist attacks. As of this writing, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Al-Shabaab, 
continues to pose a threat to Kenya’s national security. According to Allen (2020), 
Kenya has experienced at least 15 terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab since the beginning 
of 2020. Contrary to Whitaker’s (2010:657) assertion that: “Kenya is a reluctant partner 
in the counter-terrorism regime, cooperating strongly in some areas and resisting 
compliance in others”, the country has significantly stepped up its counter-terrorism 
cooperation in all areas of the regime.  
Since Whitaker authored the 2010 article, Kenya has joined forces with the United 
States to establish the first Joint Terrorism Task Force outside the United States (FBI 
National Press Office, 2020) and has willingly forged and perceived international 
cooperation and collaboration crucial towards combating terrorism (Mogire & Mkutu 
Agade, 2011:489). As a way to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with global 
powers, Kenya reached out to the United States, Britain and Israel, allowing their 
intelligence services to play a leading role in its domestic terrorism cases and “use its 
territory to pursue terrorists operating there and in neighbouring countries” (Mogire & 
Mkutu Agade, 2011:479). This perceived threat of terrorism by Kenya accelerated its 
involvement in regional and international efforts on countering terrorism. In effect, 
Kenya remains a key member of AMISOM and is an active member of the Partnership 
for Regional East African Counter-terrorism (PREACT) (Mwangi, 2018).  
In comparison, since the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, Tanzania has only 
experienced low-level extremist violence, which nevertheless poses an existential 
threat to the state. This perhaps explains its non-involvement in AMISOM, the AU 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia, its non-participation in the U.S.-led coalition against 
the Islamic State and its reluctance to designate Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State as 
a terrorist organisation (U.S. State Department, 2019). Furthermore, Tanzania’s 
reluctance to cooperate with global counter-terrorism efforts led by the United States 




Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 titled Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States. On 31 January 2020, the White House banned 
Tanzanian nationals together with nationals from several other countries (e.g. 
Myanmar, formerly Burma, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria and Sudan) from entering the 
United States for non-compliance on matters pertaining to hard-core aspects of the 
counter-terrorism regime. Key amongst the proclamations was that (1) the state 
Tanzania does not sufficiently share intelligence pertaining to terrorism and security 
matters that may comprise the homeland of the United States.; and (2) relative to other 
countries in the world, the country presents an elevated danger of its citizens travelling 
to the United States.  
The above castigation and punitive measures imposed by the United States on 
Tanzania but not Kenya clearly illustrates that the former (from a United States point 
of view) is not a reliable partner on global counter-terrorism measures. Whitaker 
(2010:646) explains that leaders, even though their countries have been targeted by 
terrorism, they may not see the urgency to respond swiftly as they believe the attacks 
were collateral damage. The initial may have been western governments or 
international organisations such structures of the United Nations. Since Tanzania’s 
only major experience with terrorism targeted the U.S. Embassy in 1998, one may 
conclude that the country perceives the terrorism threat differently from Kenya, which 
aligns with Whitaker’s (2010:646) key assumptions that states will comply with bilateral 
and international commitments and treaties if their domestic and foreign policy goals 
converge with that of the regime.  
Furthermore, the available scholarship evidence strongly suggests that Tanzania, 
unlike Kenya, views the threat of terrorism quite differently if one considers its policy 
stance on bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives. One may argue that 
this kind of laissez-faire posture by Tanzania is because Tanzania is the only country 
that denounced the sweeping provisions of Resolution 1373 before it was adopted on 
the 28th of September 2001 (Laurenti, 2002:24). It can, therefore, be argued that 
Tanzania perceives the international counter-terrorism regime as an imposed order 
that caters for Western interests. Moreover, in the report titled Global Survey of the 
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) by Member States, the 
CTED observes that Kenya is the only country that has developed an overarching 




financing of terrorism (CTED, 2016:29). This achievement by Kenya may be attributed 
to the strong relationship it has with the United States that continually provides the 
necessary technical and financial assistance in the key thematic areas (e.g. counter-
financing of terrorism and law enforcement) of Resolution 1373. Notwithstanding its 
perception of the threat it faces from terrorism, Kenya perhaps cooperates with the UN 
and the United States to expand its interests beyond the counter-terrorism regime 
(becoming a regional hegemon). Unlike Tanzania, Kenya is recognised by the CTED 
as having dedicated units tasked with prosecuting terrorist-related cases and 
specialised police divisions that employ special investigative techniques.  
 
4.10.2 Financial resources 
Both Kenya and Tanzania as developing countries rely on external funding to finance 
their major counter-terrorism operations and initiatives. As a major target of terrorism 
compared with Tanzania, Kenya has been and continues to be a major beneficiary of 
U.S. counter-terrorism aid, having received over US$400 million over the last decade 
and receiving over US$1 billion annually in development aid that is meant to offset the 
threat of terrorism (CEP, 2020:9). According to the U.S. Congressional Research 
Service (CSR) report of 2019, “Kenya ranks among the top U.S. foreign aid recipients 
globally and is one of the largest African recipients of U.S. counterterrorism 
assistance” (CSR, 2019:1).  
In addition, Kenya is also highly placed in the list of global non-counter-terrorism aid, 
receiving US$800 million annually. In terms of the scale, there is no comparison 
between Kenya and Tanzania regarding the magnitude of counter-terrorism funding 
and aid. As the 2017 CSR report on Tanzania states, “Tanzania receives some 
counter-terrorism assistance through the U.S. State Department-led multi-country 
PREACT” (CSR, 2017:27). For the above reasons, one may argue that Tanzania’s 
limited level of compliance on regional and international terrorism cooperation is in 
part due to its limited fiscal position as a developing country.  
The hard-core aspects of counter-terrorism require significant financial resources, and 
a developing nation such as Tanzania perceives the threat of terrorism as minimal 




moderate level of compliance with the regime gives credence to the underlying 
postulation of Whitaker (2010:648) that one should expect higher levels of compliance 
from countries that are highly dependent on financial and other forms of assistance. 
However, financial assistance for countries with high levels of corruption such as 
Kenya is not always directed towards its intended purpose. As Boutton (2014:742) 
perceptively asserts:  
Sending foreign assistance to a country for the purpose of combating terrorism 
signals a donor’s strategic interest in the recipient. Because the donor’s national 
interest is at stake, the recipient is confident that aid will not be withdrawn, even 
if it suspects that a large portion of it is misspent.  
 
4.10.3 Domestic political institutions 
With reference to the enactment of domestic counter-terrorism legislation and as 
mentioned in the previous section, the Parliament of Tanzania passed its Prevention 
of Terrorism Act of 2002 with minimum debate or opposition from parliamentarians 
and civil society organisations. Ironically, this occurred as civil society organisations 
were vocal about a bill that that was equally detrimental towards the operations and 
freedom of non-governmental organisations (Whitaker, 2010:656). If this were to be 
considered a measure of compliance, Tanzania would have been declared a willing 
partner by the UN’s CTED because it domesticated counter-terrorism legislation.  
Despite the reluctance by Tanzania to become involved in a variety of 
counter-terrorism efforts driven by the United States, the country has one of the 
strongest counter-terrorism legal instruments in the region and its terrorism law, 
modelled after the USA PATRIOT Act, is “broad, detailed and generally consistent with 
prevailing international norms” (Bailey, 2019:248). In comparison, fierce parliamentary 
debate ensued in Kenya’s legislative chambers as two counter-terrorism laws were 
rejected on different intervals by the governing party’s political opponents. The attempt 
to pass the ‘Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003’ was vehemently rejected by the 
Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs Committee because it “threatens to tear 
apart the very fabric of one nation and could offer fertile ground for inter-religious 




Whitaker’s (2010) and other scholars’ assertions that as much as democratic 
governments tend to comply with international commitments, party politics can stall 
laws that are meant to cooperate with the counter-terrorism regime. This can be 
attributed to “contradicting findings as to whether democratic institutions increase or 
decrease compliance with international agreements” (Whitaker, 2010:649).  
Amplifying the argument above is the assertion by Cortright et al. (2007:30) that there 
is no global consensus on a criterion to evaluate the implementation of counter-
terrorism measures and the required steps needed to achieve compliance by member 
states. Put differently, should the enactment of counter-terrorism legislation by Kenya 
or Tanzania serve as a ‘checklist’ for complying with the regime without 
operationalising the key provisions thereof? The most compelling argument is 
presented by Romaniuk (2010:593) who contends that the existing institutions 
established to combat terrorism “have been neither uniform nor constant and 
cooperation has advanced more quickly in some domains than others”. In view of the 
above, it becomes contentious to measure compliance in the absence of a compliance 
or operational framework despite the fact that Kenya and Tanzania have both 
complied to varying degrees with the UN, the United States and other Western powers.  
Closely related to ‘domestic political institutions’ is ‘competing domestic 
constituencies’ since they both denote a degree of resistance to the implementation 
of the counter-terrorism regime. 
 
4.10.4 Competing domestic constituencies 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the theoretical aspects of the factor, Competing Domestic 
Constituencies, is generally divided between a segment of society that is determined 
to protect civil liberties and a government that is committed to protect its citizens from 
the onslaught of terrorism. In the case of Kenya, human rights activists, more 
specifically, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) has been at 
the forefront of being a vocal ‘non-compliance’ constituency regarding 
counter-terrorism operations being enforced by Kenya’s security forces. In their 
damning 2015 report, ‘The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror: Report of KNCHR 




Terrorism’, several recommendations are suggested to reform the way Kenya’s 
security forces operate in their attempt to investigate and prosecute terrorist suspects. 
One recommendation makes a clarion call:  
The President should acknowledge and condemn the abuses by security 
agencies and call upon them to ensure respect for the rule of law and human 
rights in the fight against terrorism. He should issue an official public apology to 
the survivors and families of victims of the abuses (KNCHR, 2015:40).  
Similarly, Smith (2014) narrates how one of the activists labelled the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 2012 (amended 2014): “It’s not an anti-terror bill, it’s an anti-media, 
anti-activist, anti-citizens bill. They can arrest me without evidence or a warrant. We 
are going back to the days of dictatorship”. These sentiments and concerns are shared 
in both Kenya and Tanzania, countries with significant Muslim populations that 
continue to be disproportionately targeted by counter-terrorism operations and that 
have established organisations and platforms to air their grievances. In Kenya, the 
Muslim community played a significant role in the denouncing and the ultimate 
rejection of both the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003 and the Anti-Terrorism Bill 
2006. Thurston (2012) argues that as a significant voting constituency, “a high degree 
of Muslim unity seems to have been a critical factor in making this pressure felt”. As 
the previous sections pointed out, Tanzania, unlike Kenya, passed its 
counter-terrorism legislation with relative ease, passing through its legislative 
chambers without amendments despite protests from the Muslim community.  
 
4.11 Conclusion 
This chapter served as the analysis of the theoretical framework applied to the two 
case studies. The central tenets of the regime theory pertaining to regime formation 
and compliance were applied as an analytical tool to assess the various 
counter-terrorism laws, policies, programmes and to present the patterns and depth 
of cooperation with regional and international institutions by Kenya and Tanzania in 
the fight against terrorism. The chapter provided an overview of the terrorism 
landscapes of Kenya and Tanzania and discussed the four specific factors that explain 




of terrorism is more pervasive in Kenya because of regional dynamics whereas in 
Tanzania, skirmishes and low-level sporadic attacks perpetrated by locals with foreign 
terrorist links have been labelled by government forces as criminal elements. The 
chapter further argued that realist theory, applying the lenses of regime analysis, 
witnessed the emergence of a counter-terrorism regime that propagated the 
domestication of counter-terrorism legislation at an international level spearheaded by 
the UN Security Council and the operational aspects thereof headed by global powers, 
more specifically, the United States. The journal article of Whitaker (2010) provided 
the four factors applied in this chapter as an analytical tool for this case study.  
The final chapter draws conclusions and determines whether the research questions 
of this study have been answered. In addition, Chapter 5 provides recommendations 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study applied regime theory as an analytical framework to evaluate the degree of 
compliance and non-compliance with the international counter-terrorism regime by 
Kenya and Tanzania. Furthermore, it delved into the key assumptions of realist and 
liberal institutionalist theory by discussing the key theoretical issues pertaining to 
compliance with international obligations and the emergence of the international 
counter-terrorism regime. Chapter 2 provided the conceptual review by introducing the 
various salient issues regarding the study of terrorism and by presenting a general 
outline of the history, understanding and definition of the concept. In addition, the 
chapter provided a brief overview of the key concepts and their relevance to the 
research questions and problem statement. Chapter 4 discussed in detail the terrorism 
landscape of Kenya and Tanzania and the central tenets of regime theory (discussed 
in Chapter 3) that were applied as an analytical tool. The analysis assessed the various 
counter-terrorism laws, policies, programmes and presented the patterns and depth 
of cooperation with regional and international institutions by Kenya and Tanzania in 
the fight against terrorism. Chapter 5 commences by evaluating the research 
questions stated in Chapter 1. The main findings and the theoretical findings are 
presented and recommendations for future areas of research are made.  
 
5.2 Research problem statement and research questions 
The literature highlights that there is not an international overarching counter-terrorism 
regime or operational framework to determine and evaluate levels of compliance. 
Kenya and Tanzania, as developing states, have been responding differently to the 
imposition of various laws and counter-terrorism efforts spearheaded by the counter-
terrorism bodies of the UN Security Council (CTED and CTC) and the United States. 
The study’s main research question is as follows:  
How do political factors explain the degree of variance in compliance with the 




The main research question guided Chapter 4 and adopted the four political factors 
outlined by Whitaker (2010). This question was answered by providing a comparative 
analysis of the various political factors that explain the variance in the compliance of 
Kenya and Tanzania with the counter-terrorism regime. To a large degree, each factor 
demonstrated how Kenya is a willing partner on the ‘war on terror’ by way of its 
perception of the terrorism threat and it being a major recipient of U.S. military and 
economic development aid compared with Tanzania. Because of the persistent threat 
it faces from Al-Shabaab, Kenya has significantly stepped up its counter-terrorism 
cooperation in all areas of the counter-terrorism regime. Furthermore, its status as an 
‘anchor state’ and its geographic proximity to political unstable states such as Sudan 
and Somalia provided the impetus to cooperate willingly with the United States to quell 
domestic and international terrorism threats.  
Compared with Tanzania, Kenya is a primary recipient of military and economic aid 
from the United States and has been able to use these resources to confront the 
scourge of terrorism and enhance its capacity to prosecute terrorist-related offences. 
Because of the limited resources that Tanzania receives from the United States and 
its threat perception of terrorism, scholarly evidence illustrates how Tanzania has been 
a reluctant partner in the global counter-terrorism campaign and has yet to designate 
terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State as terrorist organisations. 
Furthermore, the current study argues that despite its territory being used as a conduit 
to launch terror attacks, Tanzania does not participate in regional counter-terrorism 
operations such as AMISOM to thwart the threat posed by Al-Shabaab militants in the 
region. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania vehemently opposed Resolution 1373 that provided 
the international legal framework towards combating terrorism and the financing 
thereof. The country argued that the resolution provided sweeping powers to the UN 
Security Council and its monitoring bodies and encroached on its sovereignty. As the 
‘global enforcer’ of the international counter-terrorism regime, the United States 
imposed a ban on Tanzanian nationals from entering the United States because of its 
non-compliance in sharing information pertaining to public safety and terrorism. 






1. What is the nature and extent of terrorism threats in Kenya and Tanzania? 
This sub-question was addressed in Chapter 2, and Chapter 4 highlighted the varying 
degrees of terrorism threats faced by Kenya and Tanzania. Chapter 4 concluded that 
unlike Kenya, Tanzania’s experience with terrorism is limited to the 1998 U.S. 
Embassy bombings, which may explain its reluctance to be an active member and to 
comply willingly with various international and regional counter-terrorism measures. 
For the most part, the terrorism-related incidents experienced by Tanzania have been 
labelled by its security forces as acts committed by ‘criminal bandits’ and not terrorist 
organisations that indiscriminately target civilians and public spaces. Furthermore, the 
absence of a major terrorist attack that poses an existential threat to the Tanzanian 
state perhaps explains its poor approach towards combating terrorism. Regarding 
Kenya, this study has shown that the country remains on high alert as the threat from 
the Al-Shabaab terrorist network persists. The high-profile attacks on Garrisa 
University (148 casualties), the Westgate Shopping Mall (67 casualties) and the Dusit 
Hotel complex (26 casualties) demonstrates the threat that Kenya faces from the 
terrorist group. 
2. How does regime theory explain the emergence of the international 
counter-terrorism regime, particularly with respect to Kenya and Tanzania? 
This question pertained to the theory supporting this study, which explains how regime 
theory has its roots in the neo-liberal theory of IR and how it dominates the analysis of 
regime formation. Chapters 3 and 4 addressed this question by explaining the factors 
that led to the attempt to institutionalise the fight against terrorism internationally. In 
addition, the analysis of how the United States, through realist theory, shaped and 
influenced the counter-terrorism regime was presented in detail by narrating the 
impact that the events of 11 September 2001 had on the emergence of the 
international counter-terrorism regime. The adoption of Resolution 1373 spearheaded 
by the United States provided unprecedented powers to the UN Security Council that 
made it legally binding for member states to enact specific legislation that criminalises 
terrorism and the financing thereof and prohibits its members from providing a safe 





5.3 Theoretical implications 
The study employed regime theory as the theoretical anchor to explain the formation 
of regimes through the lenses of the dominant IR theories – realism and liberal 
institutionalism. Furthermore, Whitaker’s (2010) article on compliance with regimes in 
the African context made significant contributions to the study of compliance in the 
area of counter-terrorism. Nonetheless, time is a crucial factor since compliance by a 
state is influenced and determined by various internal and external dynamics that 
fluctuate over time. As demonstrated in Chapter 4 through the various political factors 
determining compliance, this study largely disagrees with Whitaker (2010) that 
Tanzania is a more willing partner than Kenya regarding the international counter-
terrorism regime. Although the four factors significantly assisted in analysing the 
varying levels of compliance by Kenya and Tanzania with the counter-terrorism 
regime, they discounted the importance of issues such as hegemony and corruption 
that play a fundamental role on the ability of these states to cooperate on counter-
terrorism measures. For example, by delving specifically into the literature on 
hegemony, the great power interests played out by the United States could have 
provided a vivid representation of how the country explicitly enforces compliance. In 
addition, because of the absence of an overarching counter-terrorism regime, the 
measurement of compliance is problematic.  
 
5.4 Recommendations for future research 
As a non-monolithic issue area, further research in the field of the counter-terrorism 
regime is certainly warranted because of the very nature of its current 
institutionalisation. As the literature demonstrated, the area of counter-terrorism 
covers a broad spectrum of issues ranging from the hard-core aspects such as 
intelligence sharing, policing, military operations and the use of drones to the soft 
aspects such as capacity building and countering violent extremism and radicalisation 
by addressing the social ills of poverty and overcoming unemployment and 
discrimination against minority groups. For the above reasons, further research is 
needed on the modalities to establish a global institution for counter-terrorism, which 




cognisant that counter-terrorism laws differ in various parts of the world and are based 
on countries’ unique histories, priorities and interests.  
Since this study only focused on Kenya and Tanzania, it is recommended that case 
studies examining the same or more factors influencing compliance are carried out in 
other parts of the developing world to assess global patterns of differences and 
similarities. This may aid in developing a comprehensive operational framework to 
measure compliance and to provide countries with the necessary resources to combat 
terrorism more effectively.  
 
5.5 Recommendations and concluding remarks 
The regime theoretical perspective was employed to explain the emergence of the 
international counter-terrorism regime by adopting two major strands of IR theory, 
namely realism and liberal institutionalism. This study argued that realism best 
explains the formation of the international counter-terrorism regime since its 
development primarily represented the interests of the United States. The factors 
underpinning compliance or non-compliance were unpacked for each case study, and 
the precipitating conditions for the varying degrees of cooperation with the regime 
were explained. There are very few studies on security cooperation that apply regime 
theory as a theoretical framework, especially on matters pertaining to 
counter-terrorism.  
Furthermore, the current study provided a comprehensive overview of the terrorism 
landscapes of Kenya and Tanzania and concluded that the former faces a significant 
threat from terrorism because of the factors, interests and the perceived threat of 
terrorism explained in chapters 2 and 4. What makes counter-terrorism challenging is 
that the definition of terrorism remains contested (as explained in Chapter 2) and thus, 
the application of counter-terrorism law and practice will invariably result in different 
interpretations and different levels of cooperation in combating international terrorism. 
The absence of a global operational framework with a common methodology to assess 
compliance continues to pose a challenge to bodies such as the CTC and CTED in 




Compliance should not only emphasise the domestication of specific counter-terrorism 
legislation but should also focus on the implementation of the key provisions without 
infringing on the political and civil liberties of those found on the wrong side of the law. 
To avoid great power rivalry between nations such as China, Russia and the United 
States, the UN Security Council should take a leading role in strengthening and 
spearheading all major counter-terrorism measures. The United States and other 
Western nations should provide assistance through channels established by the UN 
and engage in multilateral not bilateral efforts to combat terrorism in Africa. This will 
prevent accusations such as ‘imperialism’ and ‘new colonialism’ being uttered by 
states in the developing world that perceive unilateral actions in the form of sanctions 
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